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Abstract 
 
Although stock splits seem to be a purely cosmetic event, there exists ample empirical 
evidence from the different capital markets all around the world that stock splits are 
associated with abnormal returns on the announcement day. This dissertation employs a 
sample of German companies that announced a stock split during the years 2008 and 
2009, a period which signals the beginning of the economic crisis. The main objective 
the current study assesses is the impact of stock split announcements on stock prices. 
The results are not consistent with the findings in other capital markets, including the 
U.S., as no evidence of positive price reaction is observed around the announcement day 
of German stock splits. Institutional differences between Germany and other capital 
markets allow the examination of one of the main hypothesis on the announcement 
effect, which is the signaling hypothesis. We argue that legal restrictions strongly limit 
the ability of German companies to use a stock split for signaling and that stock price 
reactions are not related to future earnings. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
“A stock split is a corporate decision which increases the number of equity 
shares outstanding of a firm. Existing shareholders exchange their old shares for stocks 
with a lower par value without additional cash outlays. As stock splits do not affect the 
real activities or the financial structure of the firm, under certain assumptions, they are 
considered theoretically as irrelevant decisions” (Yagüe et al., 2009).  Despite their 
apparent innocuousness, it is well documented that split announcements provoke a 
positive reaction in share prices. There exists ample empirical evidence that in the U.S. 
stock splits are associated with positive abnormal returns around the announcement and 
the execution day and in addition to an increase in variance following the ex-split day. 
Despite the lack of any direct effects on the operational and financial structure of a firm, 
studies have shown that stock splits are not purely cosmetic events, but have a positive 
impact on share prices. “In fact, since Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) published 
their seminal paper on stock splits, a large body of research has investigated this 
particular corporate decision. The interest in stock splits is motivated by the fact that 
this event is not directly related to changes in the operating or financial structure of the 
firm and, therefore, should cause no change in stock price other than the adjustment 
warranted by the split factor” (Leledakis et al., 2009). 
Following the publication of the aforementioned study, several hypotheses have 
been put forward to explain the market reaction around the announcement day and 
extensive research has provided empirical support for various explanations. The most 
favored were the optimal trading range hypothesis tested by Lakonishok and Lev 
(1987), McNichols and Dravid (1990), the “attention-gathering” hypothesis tested by 
Grinblatt (1984) and the signaling hypothesis tested by Brennan and Copeland (1988) 
and McNichols and Dravid (1990). Signaling hypothesis offers one of the most 
plausible explanations for this market reaction and claims that managers use stock split 
announcements to convey private information to the market. “The finance literature 
considers them to be positive signals, although there are certain discrepancies over 
whether stock splits signal future earnings increases or whether the good pre-split 
earnings performance is permanent” (Yagüe et al., 2009). On the other hand, there is no 
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evidence of improved liquidity following stock splits as reported by Copeland (1979), 
Lakonishok and Lev (1987) and Conroy (1990). “In addition, several studies found that 
the neglected firm hypothesis, which was considered by Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman 
(1984), Arbel and Swanson (1993), and Rankine and Stice (1997) provided some 
explanation power as well” (Wulff, 2002). Evidence of significant positive abnormal 
returns associated with stock splits has also been reported for markets outside the U.S. 
Some important examples are included in the studies of Kryzanowski and Zhang (1991) 
for Canadian stocks, Baixauli for Spain (2007) and Bechmann’s and Raaballe’s for 
Denmark (2007). 
This study analyzes the price effects of stock splits undertaken by firms whose 
stock is traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE) during the years 2008 and 2009. 
The selection of the examined period is not arbitrary and it is chosen in order to consider 
the price effects of stock splits during the outbreak of the global economic crisis. It also 
tests empirically one of the hypotheses that have been advanced by prior literature to 
explain the abnormal price reaction to stock splits. In this study, the findings come from 
an important international stock market with rules and institutional characteristics 
different from those of U.S. markets. Also, due to institutional differences between 
Germany and U.S. not all of the existing theories seem plausible for the German case, 
thus leading to further insights into the explanation power of the competing theories. 
Moreover, “stock splits in Germany seem to have a political argument attached to them 
as well: a broad shareholder base is desirable because the more individuals own shares 
the greater the society’s acceptance of economic policies promoting the free market. As 
of today, only a low percentage of the German population, which still favors savings 
accounts and treasury securities, invests in equities” (Bley, 2002). 
In contrast to U.S. stock splits and not in line with the results of many other 
studies on stock splits in different capital markets, no evidence of significant positive 
reaction around the stock split announcement day is found for stock splits undertaken 
during the years 2008 and 2009 in the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE). Further 
empirical tests suggest that there is no evidence that market price reaction reflect the 
German firm’s private expectation about future earnings.  
This dissertation contributes to the existing literature, as it tries to extend the 
international empirical evidence on stock splits to the German capital market in a very 
specific and important time period, which marks the beginning of the global economic 
crisis. The global credit crunch has affected negatively the stock prices and the 
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fundamentals of German firms and as a consequence, it is supposed that contrary to 
previous literature no abnormal returns or signaling effects are expected following stock 
splits announcements during the years 2008 and 2009. The outline of the dissertation is 
as follows. In Chapter 2 the pertinent literature on stock splits is reviewed, while in 
Chapter 3 the institutional differences between German and U.S. stock splits are 
explained. Their implications to the applicability of the existing theories to the German 
case are analyzed in Chapter 4, which also describes the data and the sample. Chapter 6 
explains the methodology, while Chapter 7 presents and interprets the empirical results. 
Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes and concludes the dissertation. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature review 
 
“The efficient market conception of near-perfect capital markets that render only 
fleeting and nonsystematic gain and loss opportunities to investors has been criticized in 
recent years by the behavioral finance literature, which offers evidence that stock 
transactions are often executed (in relation to known events such as stock issues, stock 
splits, and repurchases) at price levels that imply predictably high or low risk-adjusted 
returns” (Byun & Rozeff, 2003). “If these findings are factually correct, they pose a 
challenge to the efficient market hypothesis, which predicts a lack of capital market 
profit and loss opportunities due to the abilities of investors rapidly and impartially to 
interpret information according to correct assessments of the underlying economic 
processes” (Dhar & Chhaochharia, 2009). 
A stock split is a corporate decision which increases the number of equity shares 
outstanding of a firm. “Existing shareholders exchange their old shares for stocks with a 
lower par value without additional cash outlays. As stock splits do not affect the real 
activities or the financial structure of the firm, under certain assumptions, they are 
considered theoretically as irrelevant decisions. As a result, by assuming efficient capital 
markets, splits should be without consequences for the price of a company’s stocks” 
(Yagüe et al., 2009). “By splitting, the invested capital is simply spread over a larger 
number of stocks with accordingly smaller values. Since splits are “just a finer slicing of 
a given cake”, as reported by Lakonishok and Lev (1987), that do not alter the future 
cash flows of a company, one would expect that stock prices would not react to the 
announcement and execution of stock splits. This raises the question of why companies 
consider splitting their stock. If there are no gains to be expected from splitting a 
company’s stock, and the company must bear transaction costs (bank commissions, 
expenses for printing publications, etc.), it does not make much sense to carry out such 
operations. However, since companies do initiate stock splits, a company must expect to 
gain something (Kunz & Rosa-Majhensek, 2008).  
Many studies on the U.S. stock splits such those of Grinblatt, Masulis and 
Titman (1984), Lamoureux and Poon (1987), McNichols and Dravid (1990), Maloney 
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and Mulherin (1992) and Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) have concluded that there 
is evidence of significant positive abnormal returns around the split announcement day. 
In particular, “Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984) found that, in the period from 1967 
to 1976, their sample of stocks realized an excess return of 3.44% during the three days 
(-1, 0, +1) surrounding stock split announcements. Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice (1996) 
examined 1,275 two-for-one stock splits announced by NYSE and Amex firms from 
1975 through 1990 and observed excess returns of 7.93% in the first year after a stock 
split and 12.15% in the first three years following a split. These gains were preceded by 
excess returns of 3.38% on the announcement date” (Kunz & Rosa-Majhensek, 2008). 
Grinblatt et al. (1984) have also observed that “the positive stock price reaction on the 
announcement day follows a significant positive price run-up in the months preceding 
the stock split decision. Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) proved that this price run-
up is followed by a persistent upward price drift, which they attributed to investors’ 
underreaction at the announcement time” (Leledakis et al., 2009). Moreover, evidence of 
significant positive abnormal price reaction was also found around the ex-day of the 
splits. This was observed by many researchers, such as Eades, Hess and Kim (1984), 
Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman (1984), Lamoureux and Poon (1987) and Maloney and 
Mulherin (1992). “Lamoureux and Poon (1987) attributed the positive market reaction to 
price pressure induced by an expansion of the investor clientele of the splitting stocks 
which generates additional positive revaluation around the ex-day, while Maloney and 
Mulherin (1992) provided evidence that the ex-day positive price reaction was a result of 
a temporary order imbalance caused by a surge of buy orders as new investors are 
attracted to the splitting stock” (Leledakis et al, 2009).  
Furthermore, “significant positive abnormal returns around the announcement 
and ex-day of splitting stocks have been also reported from markets outside the U.S. 
There are many examples in line with the above finding from different studies such as 
those of Kryzanowski and Hao (1991) for stock splits in Canadian market, Biger and 
Page (1992) for splits from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, Wu and Chan (1997) for 
Hong Kong stocks, Niini (2000) for stocks in Finland and Sweden, Bechmann and 
Raaballe (2004) for Danish stocks (2004) and Wulff (2002) for splits on the German 
Stock Exchange” (Mishra, 2007). In particular, Wu and Chan (1997) found excess 
returns on the Hong Kong stock exchange. They examined 67 splits in the period from 
1986 to 1992 and observed that the excess return over the three days surrounding a split 
announcement amounted to an astounding 18.2%. Similar observations were made on 
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the German stock exchange by Wulff (2002) who reported excess returns during the four 
days following stock split announcements as well as during the four days after the 
effective date. The respective profits, however, were much lower than those seen in the 
United States. Moreover Bechmann and Raaballe (2004) reported a positive and 
significant announcement effect of 2.5% for Danish stock splits. They explained this 
announcement effect as a consequence of an increased payout of the splitting companies 
(Kunz & Rosa-Majhensek, 2008).  
There are several theories advanced as explanations for why companies split their 
stock. However, the three most common are valuation effects generated by changes in 
liquidity and trading costs, the adjustment of price to an optimal trading range, and 
signaling which were used by many researchers in order to find an explanation for the 
market’s positive response to stock splits. Firstly, “the liquidity-improvement hypothesis 
is based on the premise that lower-priced stocks draw more investors and generate 
higher trading volume, which result to enhance the marketability and reduce the bid-ask 
spread” (Leledakis et al, 2009). “Some support for the liquidity effect is found in 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1996) and Schultz (2000), who found that the frequency 
and volume of small trades increase following a stock split” (Dennis, 2003). However, 
“the overall evidence does not seem to support the liquidity improvement hypothesis, as 
Copeland (1979) found a widening and not a reduction of the bid-ask spread as percent 
of price following stock splits”. Conroy, Harris and Benet (1990), Schultz (2000) and 
Easley, O’Hara and Saar (2001) have also reported similar results about the bid-ask 
spread in the post-split period (Leledakis et al., 2009). Results consistent with the above 
were also reported by Lakonishok and Lev (1987), who found that the announcement of 
a split generates a substantial increase in trading activity that vanishes by the second 
month following the split announcement (Lakonishok & Lev, 1987) and Lamoureux and 
Poon (1987) and Conroy, Harris and Benet (1990) who found a decrease or no change in 
the trading volume of splitting stocks (Leledakis  et al., 2009). “Bley (2002) examined 
40 stock splits in the German stock market from 1994 to 1996. To avoid any size effects, 
he divided the sample companies into two groups according to their market 
capitalization and found that, after stock splits, daily trading volume decreased 
significantly for the class of high-market-capitalization stocks. In contrast to these 
findings, Wulff (2002) reported considerable increases in trading volume subsequent to 
stock splits in Germany” (Kunz & Rosa-Majhensek, 2008). Finally, lack of evidence for 
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the liquidity hypothesis is also reported in Bechmann and Raaballe (2007) for Danish 
stocks. 
As for the trading range hypothesis, which states that “the adjustment of the price 
back to its optimal trading range can result in a positive revaluation effect, the main 
argument behind it is the preference of small investors to have low-price stocks in order 
to trade in round many of them and minimize their trading costs. On the other hand, 
large investors prefer high-price stocks since the trading cost per unit of money falls as 
the price moves higher, thus, leaving the optimal trading range effect open to empirical 
validation. Similarly, firms may use a split to achieve an optimal balance of investor 
clienteles resulting in a better valuation of their stock” (Leledakis et al., 2009). Early 
studies by Myers and Bakay (1948), Barker (1956), and Johnson (1966) report positive 
stock price appreciation net of market price indexes in the period preceding the split.  In 
later studies including those of Lakonishok and Lev (1987), Ikenberry, Rankine and 
Stice (1996) and Rozeff (1998) it was proved that stock prices increase faster for firms 
that later split their stock than for firms that actually not. “Assuming that a lower stock 
price would be more attractive to retail investors, managers might use a split to extend 
the shareholder base as reported by Lamoureux and Poon (1987). In his paper, Schultz 
(2000) analyzed 235 NASDAQ and NYSE/Amex stocks, confirmed that there is a 
substantial increase in small orders following stock splits and that a vast majority of 
these are buy orders. These findings are consistent with the notion that the shareholder 
base is increased in the wake of a split” (Kunz & Rosa-Majhensek, 2008). While 
Lakonishok and Lev (1987) concluded that splits might affect the composition of 
shareholders, in form of a shift from institutional to individual investors, Szewczyk and 
Tsetsekos (1995) reported that institutional ownership increases after a split (Bley, 
2002). Similarly, Angel et al. (2004) find increased trading activity by retail 
shareholders after the split. According to their results, “activity by small-size 
shareholders doubled over a 40-day period following a split, whereas large-volume 
traders considerably lowered their engagement. In this context, it is often argued that 
companies gain flexibility by splitting their stocks. For example, many companies seek 
to reward and motivate their employees with stocks in the company. However, if one 
share costs quite a lot, it would be difficult to make appropriately sized awards to 
employees who make only modest contributions to profitability. Lower stock prices 
allow companies to reward and motivate all their employees with stocks” (Kunz & 
Rosa-Majhensek, 2008). “Other studies, such as those of Harris and Benet (1990), 
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McNichols and Dravid (1990) and Rozeff (1998) found that stock splits follow stock 
price run-ups that push stock prices above the normal range for peer groups. Hence, 
stock split factors are found to correlate with pre-split prices and deviations from the 
perceived normal price range” (Leledakis et al., 2009). Furthermore, results reported in 
the studies of Easley, O’Hara and Saar (2001) based on the modeling of trades “also 
provided strong support for the trading range hypothesis. On the basis of a market 
microstructure sequential trade model, they concluded that trading activity of 
uninformed market participants increased following stock splits. Moreover, they 
reported a slight shift by uninformed traders (so-called “noise traders”) toward market-
order trades. As they asserted, these results are consistent with an extension of the 
shareholder base. Simultaneously, however, they found that informed trading also 
increased” (Kunz & Rosa-Majhensek, 2008). 
  Finally, according to the signaling hypothesis, “splits are means of conveying 
information from managers to stockholders. By announcing a stock split, a company can 
reduce information asymmetries that might exist between stockholders and management. 
The stock price reduction resulting from a stock split conveys management’s conviction 
of rising future earnings as supported by Fame, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969)”  (Kunz 
& Rosa-Majhensek, 2008). Generally, “while the empirical evidence regarding the 
signaling hypothesis is mixed, there is more evidence in favor of the signaling 
hypothesis than against it. Several studies find evidence in favor of a signaling 
explanation” (Dennis, 2003). “Stock splits can be informative to the market in two ways, 
as they can both be used to signal the firm’s private information about future and help 
attracting the interest of more analysts and investors and thus lead to a positive 
revaluation of the stock. Stock splits can have signaling value because they have costly 
consequences, including execution costs, higher listing fees, and greater trading costs 
associated with price drops, as reported by Brennan and Copeland (1988), and as a result 
only firms with positive private information can afford to signal through a stock split” 
(Leledakis et al., 2009). “Brennan and Copeland (1988) also pointed out that a split 
imposes costs on current shareholders of the firm. Since each old share is not replaced 
with an integral number of new shares, investors who previously owned round lots find 
themselves with more expense to sell odd lots. Contrary to that Lamoureux and Poon 
(1987) argued that no such costs exist and, thus, a split could even be interpreted as a 
negative signal, which means that the management feels its stock price has peaked. 
While Eades (1984) supported the notion of increased transaction costs, and Copeland 
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(1979) and Branch (1985) showed transaction costs to be an inverse function of stock 
price, the case for costly signaling by stock splits remains unclear” (Bley, 2002). 
“Grinblatt et al. (1984) also remarked that competitors do not get access to information 
and management will not be held responsible for making false promises about future 
prospects when simply splitting their company’s stock. They also stress that, because of 
a split, a firm will be able to attract increasing attention from the media and investors, 
which is believed to boost its stock price” (Kunz & Rosa-Majhensek, 2008). Firms can 
split their stock in order to attract market attention as Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman 
(1984) and Brennan and Hughes (1991) reported (Leledakis et al., 2009). “Because 
institutional investors tend to ignore small firms, less information is generally available 
on small firms. Therefore, the additional information generated by a stock split is much 
more valuable to small firms than it is to large ones, about which information is usually 
abundant” (Kunz & Rosa-Majhensek, 2008). However, there is also evidence that seems 
to refute the signaling explanation as “Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1996) examined 
cases in which American Depository Receipts (ADRs) split in the United States, but the 
home-country stock underlying the ADR did not. They had two observations that 
contradict the signaling hypothesis. While they argued that if a firm wanted to signal 
good news, it would split the home-country stock as well as the ADR, on the other hand, 
they did not find above-average post-split earnings changes in firms that split their 
ADRs” (Dennis, 2003). From the above, it can be concluded that “only firms that 
believe to be undervalued or expect to perform well in the future have the incentive to 
attract attention and cause a revaluation of their fundamentals. Both these information-
based theories have received supportive evidence in the U.S., as for example, 
Lakonishok and Lev (1987) found that, compared to their peers, splitting firms have 
strong pre-split earnings performance which is not reversed after the split. These 
findings were also supported by evidence in several other studies, such in those of 
McNichols and Dravid (1990), Crawford (2005). In addition, the self-selection 
hypothesis of Ikenberry (1996) suggests that the preference for a trading range generates 
a signaling effect associated with the post-split target price. If firms wish to keep their 
share price above a floor level, they will choose a lower post-split target price the more 
optimistic they are about their future share prices. The empirical evidence of an inverse 
relationship between post-split target prices and the market reaction to stock splits is 
consistent with this hypothesis. Last but not least McNichols and Dravid (1990) not only 
reported in their studies that unanticipated earnings per share (EPS) increase after the 
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split, but also that split factors are positively related to favorable post-split earnings 
surprises and that the announcement excess returns increase with the split factor 
(Leledakis et al., 2009), while “the difference between actual and forecasted earnings 
following a split tends to be directly related to the size of the split factor: the higher the 
split factor, the better the earnings” (Dennis, 2003). 
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Chapter 3 
German Stock split Mechanisms and Empirical Implications
1
 
  
“In the U.S., as in Germany, stock splits increase the number of shares without 
leading to an inflow or outflow of cash, without changing the investment opportunities 
of the corporation, or even without changing its book value. The increase in the number 
of shares is done by reducing the par value of the share accordingly. The main difference 
between stock splits in Germany and the U.S. is largely in the fundamental role of the 
par value of German stocks. Most stocks issued by a U.S. corporation have a par value, 
but they do not need to have one. Usually the par value of a U.S. company is very low 
and its main privilege is that it does not prevent the company from deciding on a stock 
split or choosing a convenient split factor. The scope for German companies to split their 
stock is limited by the minimum par value requirement of the German corporate code (§ 
8 Aktiengesetz)”, which  states that par value shares must be denominated in Euros at 
least 1 and that higher nominal share amounts must be expressed in Euros. “Once a 
company’s stock is traded at the minimum par value, no further splits are possible. In 
1994 the minimum par value was lowered from 50 DM to 5 DM, triggering a wave of 
stock splits. A similar wave of stock splits had occurred when in 1966 the minimum par 
value was lowered from 100 DM to 50 DM.”  
Furthermore, “only certain other par values were allowed above the minimum 
par value, while before 1994, the range of possible higher par values was restricted to 
multiples of 100 DM and in 1994 it changed to multiples of the new minimum par value 
of 5 DM. In the years before each corporate law reform act, almost all stocks were 
traded at the prevailing minimum par value and although after the corporate code reform 
act of 1994 companies could have decided on a new par value below 50 DM but above 5 
DM such as 10 DM or 15 DM, none has chosen to do so and all have split their stock to 
the lowest possible par value of 5 DM. In 1994, the number of stock splits increased 
immediately after the change in legislation.”  
Moreover, “both in the U.S. and Germany, stock dividends differ from stock 
splits in their accounting treatment. A stock split increases the number of shares by 
                                                          
1
 Wulff, C. (2002). The Market Reaction to Stock Splits - Evidence from Germany. Schmalenbach 
Business Review, Vol. 54, 270 – 297. 
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reducing the par value accordingly, while a stock dividend requires a transfer from 
retained earnings. Thus, unlike a stock split, a stock dividend can reduce the financial 
flexibility of a firm. This loss of flexibility can be interpreted as a cost of signaling and 
means that the signaling content of a stock dividend announcement should be much 
higher than that of a split announcement. However, in the U.S., many empirical studies 
including those of Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman (1984) and Lakonishok and Lev 
(1987), have used the CRSP classification or the split factor instead of the actual 
accounting treatment to distinguish between stock splits and stock dividends. Other 
studies, including that of McNichols and Dravid (1990) do not distinguish between stock 
splits and stock dividends at all. Rankine and Stice (1997) showed that the CRSP 
classification of stock splits and stock dividends matches the actual accounting treatment 
in only 23% of the events in their sample. As they reported an abnormal return of 0.53% 
for stock splits in a three-day announcement period, compared to 2.24% for stock 
dividends, they show that a careful distinction between both events is crucial for 
assessing potential information contents. 
In Germany, the distinction between these two corporate events is clear cut. 
Since the minimum par value rule does not apply to German stock dividends, they occur 
regularly throughout the years. Also, the split factor of German stock dividends can be 
chosen according to the company’s level of retained earnings. Because both corporate 
events must be approved by the annual general meeting, it happens that the same 
meeting decides on a stock dividend and a stock split, as both events are not mutually 
exclusive in Germany, but can occur simultaneously. Gebhardt, Entrup and Heiden 
(1994) and Padberg (1995) found that the announcement and the execution of German 
stock dividends are both associated with similar significant positive abnormal returns, as 
it is in the U.S. To date, there has been little empirical evidence on German stock splits. 
Both Wulff (1996) and Kaserer and Mohl (1998) examined stock splits for the period 
1994-1995 and found cumulative abnormal returns of about 1% in a three-day 
announcement period from t(0) to t(+2). For larger event windows, Wulff (1996) 
reported positive, even though small, cumulative abnormal returns, but Kaserer and 
Mohl (1998) observed a reversal of the positive announcement effect by negative 
abnormal returns in surrounding days. Wulff (1996) reported an ex-day effect, while 
Kaserer and Mohl (1998) provided mixed evidence. They found a cumulative abnormal 
return of −0.19% for the event window [0; + 5] which contrasts with the positive 
cumulative returns of 1.11% and 1.18% in the event windows [−5; 0] and [−5; +5], 
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respectively. Nevertheless, due to the small sample size, the results of both papers must 
be treated with caution. In addition, Harrison (2000) used a much larger sample of 
German stock splits that covered the period from 1974 to 1997, but investigated only the 
ex-date effects of German stock splits. He found positive abnormal returns of 1.32% in 
the event window from t (−1) to t (+1) around the ex-day. However, by starting the 
observation period in 1974, Harrison omitted the cluster of stock split events around 
1969.” (Wulff, 2002) 
The current study examines the announcement effect around the German stock 
splits by using three samples of stock splits initiated by German quoted firms between 
2008 and 2009.  
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Chapter 4 
Hypothesis, Sample & Data 
4.1 Hypothesis 
 
The most popular hypothesis used by researchers in order to construe the 
announcement effects around stock splits is the signaling hypothesis and that’s the 
reason why we use it as a testable hypothesis. “The signaling hypothesis proposes that 
firms with favorable future prospects use stock splits to transmit information to 
market investors (Brennan and Copeland, 1988). The empirical evidence for the 
signaling hypothesis is mixed as in its favor stock splits are associated with 
information about future earnings (Pilotte, 1997), with increased earnings forecasts, 
(Conroy and Harris, 1999) and with reduced asymmetric information (Doran, 1994). 
Conversely, other studies conclude that stock split announcements do not convey 
information on future firm earnings (Asquith, 1989 Huang, 2006). The cost of the 
signal is the increase in the costs associated with the split including the increased 
fees paid to the exchange for trading a greater number of shares and the higher 
transaction costs due to the lower post-split stock price” (Yagüe et al., 2009).  In their 
studies, “Grinblatt et al. (1984), Asquith, Healy and Palepu (1989), and Rankine and 
Stice (1997) hypothesized that firms signal information about their future earnings 
through their split announcement decision” (Wulff, 2002).  
The managements’ scope to decide on a stock split in Germany is limited by 
regulatory constraints, which implies that there can be no signaling content in the 
choice of the split factor as McNichols and Dravid (1990) found for the U.S., since in 
Germany the split factor is largely determined by the prevailing minimum par value. 
Unlike stock dividends, stock splits are not associated with a reduction in retained 
earnings, which could otherwise act as signaling costs, as suggested by Grinblatt, 
Masulis, and Titman (1984). Moreover, the signaling models of Brennan and Copeland 
(1988) and Brennan and Hughes (1991) cannot be applied to the German case, as they 
are both based on a specific brokerage cost schedules which are different in Germany 
vis-à-vis the U.S. As a result the market reaction to German stock splits should be 
considerably lower, if it is supposed that signaling is the main driving force behind the 
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announcement effect to stock splits and stock dividends in the U.S.” (Wulff, 2002).  
 
4.2 Sample and Data 
 
The initial sample consists of all stock splits by firms listed on the official market 
segment of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE) from 2008 to 2009. There were a total 
of 237 stock splits (see Table A1 in the Appendix) in the German stock exchange over 
this period. To avoid the computation of returns from a small number of transaction 
days, sample firms with fewer than 100 trading days in the estimation period, that is, day 
-250 to day -11 relative to the event date, are excluded from the sample. This criterion 
resulted in a final sample of 194 stock splits for the price reaction tests around the 
announcement day. This sample is referred to throughout this study as “full” sample. 
Thirty-four cases were deleted from the “full” sample because their announcement day 
coincided with the announcement day of another corporate event of the same stock, such 
as a stock dividend or a rights issue, thus, leaving a sample of 160 stock splits. This 
sample is referred to throughout this study as “pure” sample. Moreover, the 34 cases, 
which were deleted from “full” sample, constitute the last sample taken under 
consideration and is referred as “contaminated” sample. Each one of the “full” and the 
“pure” samples are divided into two sub-samples based on the size of the split factors. 
As the median of the split factors is 3, stock splits with a split factor greater or equal to 3 
are included in the one sub-sample, while stock splits with a split factor smaller than 3 
are included in the other sub-sample.  
Announcement dates of the stock splits, daily closing stock prices, daily stock 
index prices, split factors and all other accounting information were extracted from the 
Bloomberg International database. The announcement date is defined as the day when 
the first public announcement of the stock split is made and it coincides with the day of 
the board’s press release that includes its stock split proposal. As a result, day 0 is 
presumed to be the date on which the market becomes aware of the firm’s intention to 
expand the number of shares. However, information may be known to the market before 
trading closed on the previous day and, therefore, could influence stock prices. The 
announcement and effective dates for the companies in the samples under investigation 
are given in the Appendix Table A1. The daily stock prices obtained from the 
Bloomberg database are used to calculate daily stock returns as the natural logarithm of 
the quotient between the closing prices of two consecutive days. The daily returns series 
of the DAX index is used as a proxy for market return. Information whether a quoted 
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price was accompanied by a transaction or not is available for all splits of the “full” 
sample, but for only few splits detailed data about trading volume could be obtained and 
as a result are not taken into consideration.  
Tables 1, 2 and 3 present the annual number of stock splits and the distribution of 
stock splits by split factor in the period 2008-2009 for each of the three samples taken 
into consideration. Stock splits appear to be not frequent corporate event in 2009, as only 
60 of the total 194 stock splits declared between 2008 and 2009 occurred in 2009, while 
the rest occurred in 2008. During 2008 the DAX index dropped from 7,323.65 in 
January 2008 to 4,657.87 in December 2008 before rising to 5,836.65 in December 
2009. Seemingly, stock splits are not driven by extraordinary stock price increases that 
push stock prices considerably above their normal trading range. The fact, however, that 
not all firms undertake stock splits under such market conditions suggests the possible 
presence of self-selection bias on firm characteristics. Nearly one third of the stock split 
factors are two-for-one (2:1), in each of the three samples, while only a low percentage 
of the split factors are below 2, which implies that stock splits undertaken by German 
firms reduce their stock prices substantially. Finally, this size distribution is very 
different to that of the U.S. market, “where half of all split factors are below 2 as 
reported by Ikenberry and Ramnath (2002)” (Yagüe et al., 2009).  
Table 1: Annual distribution of stock splits of firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange and distribution of stock splits by split factor (“Full” sample). 
Period 2008-2009. 
Year              Number of Splits                           Split Factor             Percent (%) 
2008 134 > 5 for 1 22.7% 
2009   60  5 for 1 10.8% 
Total 194  4 for 1   9.3% 
   3 for 1 10.8% 
    2.5 for 1   0.5% 
  2.25 for 1   0.5% 
   2 for 1 32.0% 
  < 2 for 1 13.4% 
   100.0% 
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Table 2: Annual distribution of stock splits of firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange and distribution of stock splits by split factor (“Pure” sample). 
Period 2008-2009. 
Year              Number of Splits                           Split Factor             Percent (%) 
2008 107 > 5 for 1 23.1% 
2009   53  5 for 1 11.9% 
Total 160  4 for 1 10.0% 
   3 for 1 11.3% 
    2.5 for 1   0.6% 
  2.25 for 1   0.6% 
   2 for 1 31.3% 
  < 2 for 1 11.3% 
   100.0% 
 
Table 3: Annual distribution of stock splits of firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange and distribution of stock splits by split factor (“Contaminated” sample). 
Period 2008-2009. 
Year              Number of Splits                           Split Factor             Percent (%) 
2008 27 > 5 for 1 20.6% 
2009   7  5 for 1   5.9% 
Total 34  4 for 1   5.9% 
   3 for 1   8.8% 
    2,5 for 1   0.0% 
  2,25 for 1   0.0% 
   2 for 1              35.3% 
  < 2 for 1  23.5% 
   100.0% 
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Chapter 5 
Methodology 
 
The price reaction to German stock splits is examined by applying the standard 
event study methodology as described in Brown and Warner (1985). This is the most 
common method that researchers use in order to examine market efficiency and to 
uncover wealth effects surrounding announcements of corporate events. Specifically, the 
current study examines whether the announcement of a stock split affects stock prices 
and consequently creates value for the company’s shareholders. Market model and 
market adjusted model, which are return-generating models, are used. 
 According to the market model, the expected daily return for stock i in time t is 
given by equation (1), while for the market-adjusted model, which states that the ex-ante 
expected return on a stock is constant across stocks and can differ across time,  is given 
by equation (2): 
 
    (1) 
E(R i,t)  R m,t)                (2) 
 
where E(R i,t) denotes the return on security i at day t, R m,t) is the return on the DAX 
index, which is the composite index of the FSE and is used as the proxy for the market 
portfolio, aˆ i  and  are ordinary least square estimates of the intercept and slope, 
respectively, of the market model regression and are estimated using the corresponding 
market return, which is calculated using the DAX index. Denoting the event date as day 
0, which is the announcement date in this case, regression coefficients are estimated over 
a period of 240 days from day -250 to day -11. Abnormal return is denoted as the 
difference between the actual return and the expected return on the security. 
Consequently, the calculation of the abnormal returns based on the market model and the 
market adjusted model is given by equation (3) and (4), respectively: 
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    (3) 
ARi,t  = R i,t  R m,t                                   (4)   
 
where ARi,t  is the abnormal return for firm i at day t, R i,t is the return on security i at day 
t, R m,t is the return on the DAX index for German stocks, which is the composite index 
of the FSE and is used as the proxy for the market portfolio and aˆ i and ˆ i  are the OLS 
estimates from the market model regression.  
Equations (3) and (4) are used to calculate the abnormal returns of one security. 
We trim all abnormal returns of the samples by excluding 0.025% of data points from 
the top and bottom tails of the data set in order to exclude from the analysis outliers in 
the data. We compute Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) using both the Market model 
and the Market adjusted model, respectively as follows. 
 
 
                 
AARt  = ∑ ARi,t       (5)  
i=1   N  
 
where N is the number of stocks that announced a split. In addition to the calculation of 
the abnormal returns based on the two models, the cumulative abnormal returns, which 
are the sum of the abnormal returns for a specific period T (from day i to day j), are also 
calculated. The formula used to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns is presented 
below in equation (6). 
 
                j 
CAR T = ∑ AR t      (6)  
t=i    
 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are computed for the following event windows (-
10, +10), (-10, -1), (+1, +10), (-5, +5), (-5, -1), (+1, +5), (-1, +1) and (-1, 0).  
Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated before and after the announcement of the 
split in order to capture possible information leakages or sluggish market reaction and 
check for market efficiency. Additionally, in order to compute the cumulative abnormal 
returns of the samples, the average of the cumulative abnormal returns, which is 
presented in equation (7), is used both for the Market model and the Market adjusted 
model. 
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                   
ACAR T = ∑ CARi,T      (7)  
i=1    N 
 
Moreover, in order to determine statistical significance, that is, whether abnormal 
returns or the average abnormal return of the splitting firms for day t are significantly 
different from zero,  the t-statistic, as recommended by Brown and Warner (1985) in the 
presence of event clustering to take into account cross-sectional correlation is computed. 
The t-statistic is calculated in equation (9) and (10) for the Market model and the Market 
adjusted model, respectively.       
              ___        ___ 
T-stat   = AR t /  (AR t)              (9) 
               ___        ___ 
T-stat   = AR t /  (AR t) *√N       (10) 
 
                           ___                     
In equation (9), AR t, is the average of the abnormal returns for day t, while  (AR t) is the 
estimated standard deviation of the abnormal returns of the splitting firms from day -250 
to day -11. On the other hand, in equation (10), AR t, represents the average abnormal 
return for day t,  (AR t) the estimated standard deviation of the average abnormal return 
of the splitting firms for day t and N the number of stocks that announced a split. 
Similarly, for the average of the cumulative abnormal returns, t-statistic is calculated in 
equation (11) and (12) for the Market model and the Market adjusted model, 
respectively.       
               ___             ___ 
T-stat   = CAR T /  (CAR T) *√T     (11) 
               ___             ___ 
T-stat   = CAR T /  (CAR T) *√T     (12) 
                                           
Finally, in equation (11), CAR T, is the average of the cumulative abnormal returns for a 
specific period T, while  (CAR T) is the estimated standard deviation of the average of 
the abnormal returns of the splitting firms from day -250 to day -11 and T is the specific 
period. On the other hand, in equation (12), CAR T, represents the average cumulative 
abnormal return for a specific period T,  (CAR T) the estimated standard deviation of 
the average cumulative abnormal return of the splitting firms for the specific period T 
and T is the specific period. 
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Chapter 6 
Test and Results 
 
Price reaction is tested relative to the announcement of the stock split. The price 
reaction (given by daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns) is estimated 
by applying the market model and the market-adjusted returns model. The composite 
index of the FSE is used as the proxy for the market portfolio. To apply the event type 
methodology, returns are computed over 261 days, from day -250 to day +10 relative to 
event day, which is day 0. 
 
6.1 Announcement price effects 
 
Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 report the findings associated with the announcement 
day for each sample examined. In particular, they show the event days -10 to +10 relative 
to the announcement day (event day 0), the daily abnormal returns for each event day -10 
to +10 relative to event day 0, the t- statistics (t[AR]) for the corresponding ARs and the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and associated t-statistics (t[CAR]) for the intervals 
(-10  +10), (-10  -1), (+1 +10), (-5 +5), (-5 -1), (+1 +5), (-1 +1) and (-1 0) around 
event day 0. 
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Table 4: Abnormal returns (AR) & Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around 
the Announcement of German Stock Splits for the Market model and Market-
adjusted model (“full” sample-all split factors) 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns around Stock Splits 
N=194 Market Model Market-adjusted Model 
Days          AR% t-statistic AR% t-statistic 
         -10 0.153%  0.52   0.221% 0.91 
-9 0.132%  0.45   0.158% 0.62 
-8 0.313%  1.06   0.431% 1.53 
-7     0.614%**  2.07     0.759%* 1.92 
-6         -0.218%           -0.74   -0.283% -1.05 
-5         -0.142% -0.48   0.296% 1.18 
-4         -0.075% -0.25  -0.099% -0.38 
-3         -0.547%* -1.85  -0.485% -1.58 
-2          0.211%  0.71   0.127% 0.35 
-1          0.098%  0.33     0.243% 0.75 
  0         -0.295% -0.99         0.044% -0.14 
  1          0.380%  1.28         0.288% 0.25 
  2         -0.268% -0.90        -4.404%** -2.19 
  3         -1.855%*** -6.26        -1.876%* -1.82 
  4         -0.520%* -1.75        -0.316% -0.61 
  5         -1.983%*** -6.69        -1.789% -1.57 
  6         -0.293% -0.99        -0.094% -0.35 
  7         -0.881%*** -2.97        -0.843% -0.93 
  8         -0.833%*** -2.81        -0.786% -1.41 
  9         -0.796%*** -2.69        -0.792%** -2.52 
           10          0.234%  0.79          0.351% 1.40 
  
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal returns around Stock Splits 
 Market Model  Market-adjusted Model 
Event Window CAR% t-statistic   CAR%  t-statistic 
(-10  +10)  -14.473%*** -10.66     -8.755%*** -2.71 
(-10  -1)         0.610%    0.65     1.339% 1.56 
(+1 +10)   -14.571%*** -15.55  -10.051%*** -3.27 
(-5 +5)    -7.218%*** -7.35    -7.894%*** -2.71 
(-5 -1)       -0.554%        -0.84      0.079%  0.11 
(+1 +5)     -6.657%***      -10.05     -7.931%*** -2.78 
(-1 +1) 0.301%   0.59     0.476%  0.42 
(-1 0)       -0.225%  -0.54      0.195%  0.48 
Notes: Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model as follows: ARi,t = Ri,t – (αi + βι*Rm,t) 
where Ri,t is the return of firm i on day t and  Rm,t is the market return on day t. Abnormal returns are 
calculated using the market-adjusted model as follows: ARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,t . 
*, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the abnormal returns (ARs) of the stocks of the “full” 
sample for each of the 20 days surrounding the event. Based on the market model, we 
observe abnormal returns of 0.211%, 0.098%, -0.295%, 0.380% and -0.268% for days -
2, -1, 0, +1 and +2, respectively. All these abnormal returns are statistically non-
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significant at any conventional level indicating that stock split announcements do not 
bring about significant stock price appreciations to investors. Moreover, it can be 
observed that the abnormal return seven days prior to the announcement day is the only 
positive (0.614%) and statistically significant at the 5% level abnormal return. The 
market-adjusted model, on the other hand, for the same range of days also indicates that 
there are not statistically significant abnormal returns at any conventional level at the 
two days prior to the announcement, the day of the announcement (day 0) and one day 
post to the announcement, while two days post the announcement the abnormal return is 
statistically significant at the 5 % level. The abnormal returns for each of these days are 
0.127%, 0.243%, -0.044%, 0.288% and -4.404%, respectively. However, as in the 
market model the results indicate that stock split announcements do not induce 
significant stock price appreciations to investors. Additionally, it can be seen that also in 
this case the only positive and statistically significant abnormal return is the abnormal 
return seven days prior to the announcement (0.759%).  
Panel B of Table 4 presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the same 
sample for several event windows based on both models. Market model CARs range 
from -14.571% to 0.610%. More particularly, for the (-1, +1) and (-1, 0) event windows, 
the CARs are 0.301% and -0.225%, respectively. It is also important to mention that the 
CARs for both these event windows are statistically non-significant at any conventional 
level. Moreover, the lowest price of -14.571% refers to the (+1, +10) event window, 
while the highest price of 0.610% to the (-10, -1) event window. The CARs based on 
market-adjusted model provide quite similar results. They range from -10.051% to 
1.339% and for the event windows (-1, +1) and (-1, 0) the CARs are both positive and 
statistically insignificant at any conventional level (0.476% and 0.195%). Similarly, the 
lowest price of -10.051% refers to the (+1, +10) event window and the highest price of 
1.339% refers to the (-10, -1) event window. 
The results from both models show that there is no market reaction relative to the 
announcement of a stock split. The evidence derived from the results is in contrast with 
the results of previous studies, as specially for the case of Germany  it was found (Wulff, 
2002) that there was low positive but statistically insignificant abnormal return at the 
announcement date itself, while at the following day the abnormal return was still 
positive but statistically significant. However, our findings are consistent with our initial 
expectations that there would be no announcement effect associated with stock splits 
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undertaken during the years 2008 and 2009, due to the global economic crisis that has 
affected negatively the stock prices and the fundamentals of German firms.  
 
Table 5: Abnormal returns (AR) & Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around 
the Announcement of German Stock Splits for the Market model and Market 
adjusted model (“full” sample-Split factor ≥ 3) 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns around Stock Splits 
N=104 Market Model Market-adjusted Model 
Days          AR% t-statistic AR% t-statistic 
         -10 0.676%  1.53 0.856%**  2.46 
-9 -0.795%* -1.80      -0.683%* -1.92 
-8 0.059%  0.13      0.083%  0.25 
-7       1.554%***  3.52 1.592%**  2.09 
-6 0.057%  0.13      -0.145% -0.38 
-5         -0.215% -0.49      0.220%  0.79 
-4         -0.289% -0.66      -0.378% -1.13 
-3         -0.375% -0.85      -0.274% -0.80 
-2   0.819%*  1.86   0.952%**  2.21 
-1         -0.279% -0.63     -0.279% -0.67 
  0 0.241%  0.55      0.379%  0.80 
  1         -0.680% -1.54     -0.736% -0.39 
  2         -0.191% -0.43   -10.222%** -2.40 
  3     -3.826%*** -8.67     -4.029% -1.66 
  4         -0.076% -0.17     -0.068% -0.07 
  5      -5.033%***         -11.40     -4.699%* -1.88 
  6     -1.609%*** -3.64     -1.573% -0.97 
  7    -3.740%*** -8.47     -3.670% -1.32 
  8     -1.334%*** -3.02     -1.453% -1.25 
  9        -0.446% -1.01     -0.426% -1.39 
           10          0.319%  0.72      0.336%  1.02 
  
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal returns around Stock Splits 
 Market Model  Market-adjusted 
Model Event Window CAR% t-statistic   CAR%  t-statistic 
(-10  +10) -23.424%*** -11.58  -23.752%*** -3.31 
(-10  -1)       0.937%     0.67      1.905%  1.54 
(+1 +10) -24.242%*** -17.37  -26.029%*** -3.71 
(-5 +5) -12.231%***   -8.36  -18.766%*** -3.04 
(-5 -1)     -0.717%   -0.73      0.236%  0.33 
(+1 +5)   -11.760%***       -11.92  -19.373%*** -3.12 
(-1 +1)     -0.207%   -0.27    -0.624% -0.33 
(-1 0)     -0.151%   -0.24      0.098%  0.19 
Notes: Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model as follows: ARi,t = Ri,t – (αi + βι*Rm,t) 
where Ri,t is the return of firm i on day t and  Rm,t is the market return on day t. Abnormal returns are 
calculated using the market-adjusted model as follows: ARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,t . 
*, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Panel A of Table 5 reports the abnormal returns (ARs) of the stocks with split 
factor higher or equal to 3 of the “full” sample for each of the 20 days surrounding the 
event. Based on the market model, we observe abnormal returns of 0.819%, -0.279%, 
0.241%, -0.680% and -0.191% for days -2, -1, 0, +1 and +2, respectively. All these 
abnormal returns are statistically non-significant at ant conventional level except for the 
abnormal return of day -2 which is both positive and statistically significant at the 10% 
level. However, the results indicate that stock split announcements do not induce 
significant stock price appreciations to investors. Moreover, we can observe that as in 
the original “full” sample the abnormal return seven days prior the announcement is also 
positive (1.554%) and statistically significant at the 1% level. The market-adjusted 
model, on the other hand, for the same range of days indicates that there are only two 
statistically significant at the 5% level abnormal returns two days prior and two days 
post to the announcement, but there are not statistically significant at any conventional 
level abnormal returns one day prior to the announcement, the day of the announcement 
(day 0) and one day post to the announcement. The abnormal returns for days -2, -1, 0, 
+1, +2 are 0.952%, -0.279%, 0.379%, -0.736% and -10.222%, respectively. However, as 
in the market model the results indicate that stock split announcements do not induce 
significant stock price appreciations to investors. Additionally, we can see that the 
abnormal return ten days and seven days prior to the announcement is positive (0.856% 
and 1.592%) and statistically significant.  
Panel B of table 5 presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the same 
sample for several event windows based on both models. Market model CARs range 
from -24.242% to 0.937%. More particularly, for the (-1, +1) and (-1, 0) event windows, 
the CARs are -0.207% and -0.151%, respectively. It is also important to mention that the 
CARs for both these event windows are statistically non-significant at any conventional 
level. Moreover, the lowest price of -24.242% refers to the (+1, +10) event window, 
while the highest price of 0.937% to the (-10, -1) event window. The CARs based on 
market-adjusted model provide quite similar results. They range from -26.029% to 
1.905% and for the event windows (-1, +1) and (-1, 0) the CARs are statistically 
insignificant at any conventional level (-0.624% and 0.098%). Similarly, the lowest 
price of -26.029% refers to the (+1, +10) event window and the highest price of 1.905% 
refers to the (-10, -1) event window.  
The results of this sub-sample with split factor higher or equal to 3 do not 
provide any substantial difference from the results of the original “full” sample.  
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Table 6: Abnormal returns (AR) & Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around 
the Announcement of German Stock Splits for the Market model and Market 
adjusted model (“full” sample-Split factor < 3) 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns around Stock Splits 
N=90 Market Model Market-adjusted Model 
Days     AR% t-statistic AR% t-statistic 
         -10 -0.337% -0.82 -0.399% -1.03 
-9  1.063%** 2.58      1.015%**  2.54 
-8  0.607% 1.47    0.834%*  1.75 
-7 -0.232% -0.56 -0.022% -0.05 
-6 -0.470% -1.14 -0.403% -0.96 
-5  0.117% 0.28  0.384%  0.88 
-4  0.213% 0.52  0.037%  0.08 
-3 -0.732%* -1.78 -0.720% -1.35 
-2 -0.784%* -1.90 -1.363% -1.55 
-1  0.716%* 1.74    1.016%*  1.79 
 0 -1.077%** -2.61 -0.711% -1.34 
 1  1.865%*** 4.53  1.726%  1.19 
 2 -0.118% -0.29  0.326%  0.41 
 3 -0.327% -0.79 -0.243% -0.58 
 4 -0.691%* -1.68 -0.292% -0.48 
 5  0.424% 1.03  0.477%  0.94 
 6 -0.345% -0.84  0.047%  0.14 
 7 -0.014% -0.03 -0.003% -0.01 
 8 -0.792%* -1.92 -0.567% -0.65 
 9 -1.387%*** -3.37   -1.360%* -1.93 
           10  0.326%  0.79  0.548%  1.12 
  
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal returns around Stock Splits 
 Market Model  Market-adjusted 
Model Event Window CAR% t-statistic  CAR%  t-statistic 
(-10  +10)     -4.338%** -2.30  0.321%  0.11 
(-10  -1)   0.231%   0.18  0.372%  0.24 
(+1 +10)       -4.043%*** -3.10  0.645%  0.28 
(-5 +5) -2.066% -1.51  0.624%  0.27 
(-5 -1) -0.346% -0.38     -0.631%       -0.54 
(+1 +5) -1.362% -1.48      1.950% 1.00 
(-1 +1)   0.891%   1.25      1.985% 1.41 
(-1 0) -0.474% -0.81      0.298% 0.39 
Notes: Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model as follows: ARi,t = Ri,t – (αi + βι*Rm,t) 
where Ri,t is the return of firm i on day t and  Rm,t is the market return on day t. Abnormal returns are 
calculated using the market-adjusted model as follows: ARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,t . 
*, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A of Table 6 reports the abnormal returns (ARs) of the stocks with split 
factor lower than 3 of the “full” sample for each of the 20 days surrounding the event. 
Based on the market model, we observe abnormal returns of -0.784%, 0.716%, -1.077%, 
1.865% and -0.118% for days -2, -1, 0, +1 and +2, respectively. Regarding to this range 
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of days, day +2 is statistically insignificant at any conventional level, while all the other 
abnormal returns are statistically significant at the 10% level for days -2 and -1, at the 
5% level for day 0 and at the 1% level for day +1. The abnormal returns at days -1 and 
+1 indicate that stock split announcements generate significant stock price appreciations 
to investors. Moreover, we can observe that the abnormal returns nine days prior to the 
announcement is positive (1.063%) and statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
market-adjusted model, on the other hand, for the same range of days indicates that there 
is only one statistically significant at the 10% level abnormal return one day prior to the 
announcement, while there are not statistically significant abnormal returns at any 
conventional level two days prior to the announcement, the day of the announcement 
(day 0) and one and two days post to the announcement. The abnormal returns for the 
days -2, -1, 0, +1, +2 are -1.363%, 1.016%, -0.711%, 1.726% and 0.326%, respectively. 
Similarly to the market model, the abnormal return at day -1 indicates that stock split 
announcements may induce significant stock price appreciations to investors. 
Additionally, we can see that the abnormal return nine days and eight days prior the 
announcement is positive (1.015% and 0.834%) and statistically significant at the 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel B of table 6 presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the same 
sample for several event windows based on both models. Market model CARs range 
from -4.338% to 0.891%. More particularly, for the (-1, +1) and (-1, 0) event windows, 
the CARs are 0.891% and -0.474%, respectively. It is also important to mention that the 
CARs for both these event windows are statistically non-significant at any conventional 
level. Moreover, the lowest price of -4.338% refers to the (-10, +10) event window, 
while the highest price of 0.891% refers to the (-1, +1) event window. The CARs based 
on market-adjusted model provide quite similar results. They range from -0.631% to 
1.985% and for the event windows (-1, +1) and (-1, 0) the CARs are statistically 
insignificant at any conventional level (1.985% and 0.298%). Furthermore, the lowest 
price of -0.631% refers to the (-5, -1) event window and the highest price of 1.985% 
refers to the (-1, +1) event window. 
Contrary to the results of the original “full” sample and its sub-sample with split 
factors higher than 3, the results of the sub-sample with split factor lower than 3 indicate 
that there may be a stock price reaction associated with the announcement of stock splits. 
These results suggest that stock splits with split factor lower than 3 may generate similar 
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announcement price reaction as that found in other studies in Germany (Wulff, 2002), 
U.S. (Lamoureux and Poon, 1987) and other capital markets.  
 
Table 7: Abnormal returns (AR) & Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around 
the Announcement of German Stock Splits for the Market model and Market 
adjusted model (“Pure” sample-all split factors) 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns around Stock Splits 
N=160 Market Model Market-adjusted Model 
Days          AR% t-statistic AR% t-statistic 
         -10 0.204%  0.55 0.281%  1.03 
-9 0.067%  0.18 0.147%  0.54 
-8 0.122%  0.33 0.268%  0.87 
-7     0.867%**  2.35   0.800%*  1.72 
-6         -0.322% -0.87        -0.420% -1.36 
-5 0.065%  0.18   0.482%*  1.71 
-4         -0.337% -0.91        -0.248% -0.85 
-3         -0.434% -1.18        -0.479% -1.37 
-2 0.256%  0.70 0.117%  0.28 
-1 0.139%  0.38 0.268%  0.70 
 0 0.093%  0.25 0.070%  0.20 
 1 0.154%  0.42 0.130%  0.09 
 2   -0.741%** -2.01    -5.611%** -2.30 
 3     -2.075%*** -5.63 -2.034% -1.62 
 4 -0.640%* -1.74 -0.452% -0.78 
 5     -2.522%*** -6.84   -2.306%* -1.67 
 6          -0.296% -0.80 -0.064% -0.21 
 7         -0.053% -0.14  0.101%  0.29 
 8    -0.934%** -2.53 -0.938% -1.41 
 9   -0.949%** -2.57     -0.942%** -2.56 
            10          0.097%  0.26  0.199%  0.70 
  
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal returns around Stock Splits 
 Market Model  Market-adjusted Model 
Event Window CAR% t-statistic  CAR%  t-statistic 
(-10  +10)   -16.787%*** -9.94  -10.364%*** -2.76 
(-10  -1)       0.877%   0.75     1.187%  1.17 
(+1 +10)   -17.211%***      -14.77  -11.619%*** -3.26 
(-5 +5)   -8.888%***        -7.27   -9.811%*** -2.80 
(-5 -1)     -0.482%  -0.59      0.138%  0.17 
(+1 +5)  -8.568%***      -10.40   -10.016%*** -2.92 
(-1 +1)      0.220%   0.35      0.456%  0.34 
(-1 0)      -0.111% -0.21      0.330%  0.70 
Notes: Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model as follows: ARi,t = Ri,t – (αi + βι*Rm,t) 
where Ri,t is the return of firm i on day t and  Rm,t is the market return on day t. Abnormal returns are 
calculated using the market-adjusted model as follows: ARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,t . 
*, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Panel A of Table 7 reports the abnormal returns (ARs) of the stocks of the “pure” 
sample for each of the 20 days surrounding the event (day 0). Based on the market 
model, we observe abnormal returns of 0.256%, 0.139%, 0.093%, 0.154% and -0.741% 
for days -2, -1, 0, +1 and +2, respectively. All these abnormal returns are statistically 
non-significant at ant conventional level except for the abnormal return of day +2, which 
is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level.  This range of days indicates that 
stock split announcements do not bring about significant stock price appreciations to 
investors. Moreover, we can observe that as in the original “full” sample and in its sub-
sample with split factor higher than 3, the abnormal return seven days prior to the 
announcement date is also positive (0.867%) and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Similarly, the market-adjusted model for the same range of days also indicates that there 
are not statistically significant at any conventional level abnormal returns, except for the 
abnormal return two days post to the announcement, which is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The abnormal returns for days -2, -1, 0, +1 and +2 are 
0.117%, 0.268%, 0.070%, 0.130% and -5.611%, respectively. Similarly, as in the market 
model, the results indicate that stock split announcements do not induce significant stock 
price appreciations to investors. Additionally, we can see that the abnormal returns seven 
days and five days prior to the announcement date are both positive (0.800% and 
0.482%) and statistically significant the 10% level.  
Panel B of table 7 presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the same 
sample for several event windows based on both models. Market model CARs range 
from -17.211% to 0.877%. More particularly, for the (-1, +1) and (-1, 0) event windows, 
the CARs are 0.220% and -0.111%, respectively. However, also in this case is important 
to mention that the CARs for both these event windows are statistically non-significant 
at any conventional level. Moreover, the lowest price of -17.211% refers to the (+1, +10) 
event window, while the highest price of 0.877% to the (-10, -1) event window. The 
CARs based on market-adjusted model provide quite similar results. They range from -
11.619% to 1.187% and for the event windows (-1, +1) and (-1, 0) the CARs are  
statistically insignificant at any conventional level (0.456% and 0.330%).  Finally, the 
lowest price of -11.619% refers to the (+1, +10) event window and the highest price of 
1.187% refers to the (-10, -1) event window. 
The results from both models are in line with those of the original “full” sample 
and its sub-sample with split factor higher than 3 and contrary to those of previous studies 
in Germany (Wulff, 2002) and other capital markets, such as in U.S (Lakonishok & Lev, 
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1987) and (McNichols & Dravid, 1990), Spain (Yagüe et al., 2009) and India (Mishra, 
2007), as no announcement effect is associated with stock splits. Despite the fact that 
thirty-four cases were deleted from the original “full” sample, as their announcement day 
coincided with the announcement day of another corporate event of the same stock, such 
as a stock dividend or a rights issue no changes in the results was found. Finally, the 
results are in line with the initial expectation that there would be no announcement effect 
associated  only with stock splits undertaken during the years 2008 and 2009, due to the 
global economic crisis that has affected negatively the stock prices and the fundamentals 
of German firms. 
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Table 8: Abnormal returns (AR) & Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around 
the Announcement of German Stock Splits for the Market model and Market 
adjusted model (“Pure” sample-Split factor ≥ 3) 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns around Stock Splits 
N=90 Market Model Market-adjusted Model 
Days          AR% t-statistic     AR% t-statistic 
                                 -10 0.662%  1.37   0.854%** 2.18 
-9         -0.760% -1.58     -0.608% -1.51 
-8 0.087%  0.18       0.159% 0.45 
-7       1.836%***  3.81   1.786%** 2.04 
-6 0.222%  0.46     -0.001% 0.00 
-5         -0.012% -0.02       0.378% 1.23 
-4         -0.483% -1.00     -0.493% -1.29 
-3         -0.351% -0.73     -0.415% -1.13 
-2   0.944%*  1.96  1.078%** 2.27 
-1         -0.345% -0.72     -0.361% -0.77 
 0 0.259%  0.54       0.526% 1.04 
 1         -0.667% -1.38     -0.635% -0.29 
 2         -0.253% -0.52   -11.856%** -2.41 
 3    -4.473%*** -9.28     -4.580% -1.63 
 4        -0.227% -0.47     -0.165% -0.15 
 5   -5.986%***         -12.42     -5.523%* -1.92 
 6   -1.859%*** -3.86     -1.722% -0.92 
 7   -2.824%*** -5.86     -2.658% -1.00 
 8  -1.361%*** -2.82     -1.481% -1.10 
 9       -0.539% -1.12     -0.472% -1.39 
             10        0.249%  0.52      0.246% 0.68 
  
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal returns around Stock Splits 
 Market Model  Market-adjusted Model 
Event Window CAR% t-statistic  CAR%  t-statistic 
(-10  +10) -25.561%***      -11.57  -25.365%*** -3.13 
        (-10  -1)       1.478%   0.97       2.324%  1.63 
(+1 +10) -26.875%***      -17.63  -28.203%*** -3.57 
(-5 +5) -14.318%*** -8.96  -21.555%*** -3.04 
(-5 -1)     -0.692% -0.64       0.182%  0.22 
(+1 +5)   -13.891%***      -12.89    -22.252%*** -3.12 
(-1 +1)     -0.153% -0.18      -0.459% -0.21 
(-1 0)     -0.218% -0.32       0.162%  0.29 
Notes: Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model as follows: ARi,t = Ri,t – (αi + βι*Rm,t) 
where Ri,t is the return of firm i on day t and  Rm,t is the market return on day t. Abnormal returns are 
calculated using the market-adjusted model as follows: ARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,t . 
*, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A of Table 8 reports the abnormal returns (ARs) of the stocks with split 
factor higher or equal to 3 of the “pure”  sample for each of the 20 days surrounding the 
event. Based on the market model, we observe abnormal returns of 0.944%, -0.345%, 
0.259%, -0.667% and -0.253% for days -2, -1, 0, +1 and +2, respectively. Moreover, we 
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can observe that there is only one statistically significant at the 10% level abnormal 
return  two days prior to the announcement, but there are not statistically significant at 
any conventional level abnormal returns one day prior to the announcement, the day of 
the announcement (day 0), one and two days post to the announcement. This range of 
days indicates that stock split announcements do not induce significant stock price 
appreciations to investors. Furthermore, we can observe that as in the previous samples 
except for the “full” sample with split factor lower than 3, the abnormal return seven 
days prior to the announcement date is also positive (1.836%) and statistically 
significant. On the other hand, for the same range of days the market-adjusted model 
indicates that there are only two statistically significant at the 5% level abnormal returns 
two days prior and two days post to the announcement, but there are not statistically 
significant at any conventional level abnormal returns one day prior to the 
announcement, the day of the announcement (day 0) and one day post to the 
announcement. The abnormal returns for days -2, -1, 0, +1 and +2 are 1.078%, -0.361%, 
0.526%, -0.635% and -11.856%, respectively. Similarly, as in the market model, the 
results indicate that stock split announcements do not induce significant stock price 
appreciations to investors. Similarly to the “full” sample with split factor higher than 3, 
we can see that the abnormal return ten days and seven days prior to the announcement 
date are also positive (0.854% and 1.786%) and statistically significant at the 5% level.  
Panel B of table 8 presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the same 
sample for several event windows based on both models. Market model CARs range 
from -26.875% to 1.478%. More particularly, for the (-1, +1) and (-1, 0) event windows, 
the CARs are -0.153% and -0.218%, respectively. However, also in this case is 
important to mention that the CARs for both these event windows are statistically non-
significant at any conventional level. Moreover, the lowest price of -26.875% refers to 
the (+1, +10) event window, while the highest price of 1.478% to the (-10, -1) event 
window. The CARs based on market-adjusted model provide quite similar results. They 
range from -28.203% to 2.324% and for the event windows (-1, +1) and (-1, 0) the 
CARs are  statistically insignificant at any conventional level (-0.459% and 0.162%). 
Finally, the lowest price of -28.203% refers to the (+1, +10) event window, while the 
highest price of 2.324% to the (-10, -1) event window. 
The results of this sub-sample with split factor higher or equal to 3 do not 
provide any substantial difference from the results of the original “pure” sample. The 
only difference that can be mentioned is the existence of statistically significant 
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abnormal return two days prior to the announcement day, which  however cannot lead to 
a different conclusion as there is no other statistically significant at any conventional 
level abnormal return in the other days  around the announcement day.    
 
Table 9: Abnormal returns (AR) & Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around 
the Announcement of German Stock Splits for the Market model and Market 
adjusted model (“Pure” sample-Split factor < 3) 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns around Stock Splits 
N=70 Market Model Market-adjusted Model 
Days          AR% t-statistic AR% t-statistic 
         -10         -0.211% -0.22     -0.288% -0.57 
-9 0.968%  1.01 1.038%**  2.09 
-8 0.135%  0.14      0.362%  0.57 
-7 0.214%  0.22      0.280%  0.38 
-6         -1.120% -1.17     -1.124%* -1.85 
-5 0.259%  0.27      0.613%  0.71 
-4         -0.109% -0.11      0.975%  0.76 
-3         -0.108% -0.11     -0.141% -0.11 
-2         -1.253% -1.31     -2.015% -1.34 
-1 1.437%  1.50       1.744%  1.36 
  0         -0.397% -0.41     -0.228% -0.09 
  1 0.720%  0.75      0.634%  0.22 
  2         -1.305% -1.36      0.562%  0.27 
  3        -0.800% -0.83     -0.668% -0.60 
  4        -1.241% -1.29     -0.960% -0.79 
  5        -0.101% -0.10     -0.124% -0.12 
  6        -0.521% -0.54     -0.159% -0.32 
  7         0.554%  0.58      0.752%  1.11 
  8        -1.309% -1.36     -1.175% -0.74 
  9   -2.667%*** -2.78     -2.765%* -1.88 
              10         0.940%  0.98      1.155%  1.02 
  
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal returns around Stock Splits 
 Market Model  Market-adjusted 
Model Event Window CAR% t-statistic  CAR%  t-statistic 
(-10  +10)        -5.874% -1.34     -1.533% -0.46 
(-10  -1) 0.229%   0.08      1.442%  1.31 
(+1 +10) -5.712%* -1.88     -2.748% -0.85 
(-5 +5)      -2.858% -0.90  0.391%  0.13 
(-5 -1)          0.242%   0.11  1.175%  1.13 
(+1 +5)      -2.709% -1.26     -0.556% -0.19 
(-1 +1) 1.766%   1.06  2.151%  0.61 
(-1 0) 1.046%   0.77  1.517%  0.41 
Notes: Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model as follows: ARi,t = Ri,t – (αi + βι*Rm,t) 
where Ri,t is the return of firm i on day t and  Rm,t is the market return on day t. Abnormal returns are 
calculated using the market-adjusted model as follows: ARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,t . 
*, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Panel A of Table 9 reports the abnormal returns (ARs) of the stocks with split 
factor lower than 3 of the “pure” sample for each of the 20 days surrounding the event. 
Based on the market model, we observe abnormal returns of -1.253%, 1.437%, -0.397%, 
0.720% and 1.305% for days -2, -1, 0, +1 and +2, respectively. All these abnormal 
returns are statistically non-significant at any conventional level indicating that stock 
split announcements do not bring about significant price appreciations to investors. 
Additionally, the market-adjusted model, for the same range of days, also indicates that 
there are not statistically significant at any conventional level abnormal returns at the 
two days prior to the announcement, the day of the announcement (day 0), one and two 
days post to the announcement. The abnormal returns for each of these days are -
2.015%, 1.744%, -0.228%, 0.634% and 0.562%, respectively. Similarly, as in the market 
model, the results indicate that stock split announcements do not induce significant stock 
price appreciations to investors. Additionally, we can see that the abnormal return nine 
days prior to the announcement date is positive (1.038%) and statistically significant at 
the 5% level.  
Panel B of table 9 presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the same 
sample for several event windows based on both models. Market model CARs range 
from -5.874% to 1.766%. More specifically, for the (-1, +1) and (-1, 0) event windows, 
the CARs are 1.766% and 1.046%, respectively. However, also in this case is important 
to mention that the CARs for both these event windows are statistically non-significant 
at any conventional level. Moreover, the lowest price of -5.874% refers to the (-10, +10) 
event window and the highest price of 1.766% refers to the (-1, +1) event window. The 
CARs based on market-adjusted model provide quite similar results. They range from -
2.748% to 2.151% and for the event windows (-1, +1) and (-1, 0) the CARs are  
statistically insignificant at any conventional level (2.151% and 1.517%). Finally, the 
lowest price of -2.748% refers to the (+1, +10) event window and the highest price of 
2.151% refers to the (-1, +1) event window. 
As in the previous sub-sample the results of this sub-sample with split factor 
lower than 3 do not provide any substantial difference from the results of the original 
“pure” sample. We can conclude though, that the division of the original “pure” sample 
to two sub-samples based on the split factors does not affect the existence of positive 
and statistically significant abnormal returns around the announcement day.  
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Table 10: Abnormal returns (AR) & Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around 
the Announcement of German Stock Splits for the Market model and Market 
adjusted model (“Contaminated” sample-all split factors) 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns around Stock Splits 
N=34 Market Model Market-adjusted Model 
Days         AR% t-statistic AR% t-statistic 
-10 -0.330% -0.55 -0.345% -0.46 
-9  0.535%  0.89  0.255%  0.35 
-8        1.686%***  2.81  1.666%  1.57 
-7      -1.882%*** -3.14 -1.330% -0.68 
-6 0.260%  0.43  0.344% 0.67 
-5         -0.780% -1.30 -0.560% -1.07 
-4 0.815%  1.36  0.585%  1.01 
-3 -1.064%* -1.77 -0.516% -0.81 
-2 0.104%  0.17  0.170%  0.27 
-1 0.043%  0.07  0.124%  0.29 
0         -0.712% -1.19 -0.563% -0.78 
1    1.418%**  2.37  1.010%  1.09 
2          1.015%  1.69    1.134%*  1.76 
3         -0.842% -1.41     -1.151%** -2.65 
4 0.032%  0.05  0.308%  0.26 
5 0.490%  0.82  0.583%  1.39 
6         -0.281% -0.47 -0.234% -0.41 
7     -4.679%*** -7.81 -5.177% -1.08 
8         -0.371% -0.62 -0.088% -0.14 
9         -0.098% -0.16 -0.105% -0.23 
10          0.861%  1.44      1.047%**  2.20 
  
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal returns around Stock Splits 
 Market Model  Market-adjusted 
Model Event Window CAR% t-statistic  CAR%  t-statistic 
(-10  +10) -3.780% -1.38  -2.842% -0.53 
(-10  -1) -0.612% -0.32   0.395%  0.26 
(+1 +10) -2.455% -1.30  -2.673% -0.53 
(-5 +5)  0.519%  0.26   1.125%  0.62 
(-5 -1)       -0.882% -0.66  -0.196% -0.20 
(+1 +5)  2.113%  1.58   1.884%  1.13 
(-1 +1)  0.750%  0.72   0.571%  0.45 
(-1 0)       -0.669% -0.10      -0.439% -0.57 
Notes: Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model as follows: ARi,t = Ri,t – (αi + βι*Rm,t) 
where Ri,t is the return of firm i on day t and  Rm,t is the market return on day t. Abnormal returns are 
calculated using the market-adjusted model as follows: ARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,t . 
*, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A of Table 10 reports the abnormal returns (ARs) of the stocks of the 
“contaminated” sample for each of the 20 days surrounding the event. Based on the 
market model, we observe abnormal returns of 0.104%, 0.043%, -0.712%, 1.418% and 
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1.015% for days -2, -1, 0, +1 and +2, respectively. Regarding to this range of days, there 
is a statistically significant at the 5% level abnormal return only one day post to the 
announcement of the stock split while all the other abnormal returns are statistically non-
significant at any conventional level. The abnormal return at day +1 indicates that stock 
split announcements generate significant stock price appreciations to investors.  
Furthermore, we can observe that the abnormal return eight days prior to the 
announcement date is positive (1.686%) and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Moreover, the market-adjusted model for the same range of days also indicates that there 
is only one statistically significant abnormal return two days post to the announcement, 
but there are not statistically significant at any conventional level abnormal returns at the 
two days prior to the announcement, the day of the announcement (day 0) and one day 
post to the announcement. The abnormal returns for days -2, -1, 0, +1 and +2 are 
0.170%, 0.124%, -0.563%, 1.010% and 1.134%, respectively. Similarly to the market 
model, the abnormal return at day +2 indicates that stock split announcements may 
induce significant stock price appreciations to investors.  Additionally, we can see that 
the abnormal return ten days  post to the announcement date is positive (1.047%) and 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  
Panel B of table 10 presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the same 
sample for several event windows based on both models. Market model CARs range 
from -3.780% to 2.113%. More particularly, for the (-1, +1) and (-1, 0) event windows, 
the CARs are 0.750% and -0.669%, respectively. Similarly to previous samples, also in 
this case the CARs for both these event windows are statistically non-significant at any 
conventional level. Moreover, the lowest price of -3.780% refers to the (-10, +10) event 
window, while the highest price of 2.113% to the (+1, +5) event window. The CARs 
based on market-adjusted model provide quite similar results. They range from -2.842% 
to 1.884% and for the event windows (-1, +1) and (-1, 0) the CARs are  statistically 
insignificant at any conventional level (0.571% and -0.439%). Finally, the lowest price 
of -2.842% refers to the (-10, +10) event window and the highest price of 1.884% refers 
to the (+1, +5) event window. 
Contrary to the results of the original “full” and “pure” sample, the results of the 
“contaminated” sample indicate that there may be a stock price reaction associated with 
the announcement of stock splits. However, we cannot derive a clear conclusion as apart 
from the fact that the sample under consideration consist of only 34 companies, thus it is 
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a small sample, it is also consisted of stocks that have announced contemporarily two 
different corporate events, a dividend and a stock split.  
 
6.2 Signaling test 
 
The signaling theory of stock splits predicts that managers attempt to convey 
their private positive expectations about their firm’s prospects. Consistent with this, 
McNichols and Dravid (1990) find significant improvement in earnings per share (EPS) 
for splitting stocks. (McNichols & Dravid, 1990) Lakonishok and Lev (1987) find that 
EPS improves in the pre-split period and remains stable afterwards. (Lakonishok & Lev, 
1987) 
In order to test for signaling effects, pre-split and post-split earnings per share 
(EPS) are compared. In table 11, 12 and 13 the mean and median earnings per share are 
reported, along with associated statistics from various years and periods prior and after 
the year of the split announcement for the “full”, the “pure” and the “contaminated” 
sample, respectively. In each table, panel A reports mean and median earnings per share 
for all the split factors of the respective sample. The mean and the median reported in 
panel B are based on earnings per share for split factors higher or equal to 3, which is the 
median of all the split factors, while panel C reports mean and median earnings per share 
for split factors lower than 3. The p-value of the t-statistic is used in order to test for the 
difference in the mean EPS from one period to another, while the Wilcoxon/Mann-
Whitney p-value is used to test for the difference of the median EPS from one period to 
another. 
 As it can be shown in panel A of Table 11, the mean EPS is 14.48 one year prior 
to the year of the stock split and it decreases by 11.42 to 3.06 during the year of the 
stock split, which is denoted as year 0. Additionally, the median EPS for the same time 
period decreases from 1.33 to 0.70. The reason why mean and median values may differ 
substantially is the existence of some outliers in the samples’ data. The decrease is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level for the mean and even for one percent level 
for the median EPS (p-value is 0.016; Wilcoxon p-value is 0.005). Similarly, the mean 
EPS has decreased, relative to year -1, to 2.71 in year +1, which is the year just after the 
year of the stock split, while the median for the same period decreased to 0.43. The 
decrease is significant at the one percent level for both the mean and the median EPS, as 
p-value and Wilcoxon p-value are equal to 0.004 and 0.00, respectively. Furthermore, 
the mean EPS has also decreased, relative to year -1, to 3.77 in year +2, while the 
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median for the same period decreased to 0.52. The associated decrease of the mean EPS 
is statistically significant at the five percent level (p-value is 0.011), while the decrease 
of the median EPS is statistically significant at the one percent level (Wilcoxon p-value 
is 0.00). Finally, the mean EPS has decreased, relative to year -1, to 4.14 in year +3, 
while the median for the same period decreased to 0.51. The associated decrease of the 
mean EPS is statistically significant at the five percent level (p-value is 0.018), while the 
decrease of the median EPS is statistically significant at the one percent level (Wilcoxon 
p-value is 0.00). 
 Moreover, in panel B of Table 11, it can be observed that the mean EPS is 24.68 
one year prior to the year of the stock split and it decreases by 17.2 to 7.48 during the 
year of the stock split. Additionally, the median EPS for the same time period decreases 
from 2.47 to 0.69. The decrease is statistically significant at the 5 percent level for the 
mean and for one percent level for the median EPS (p-value is 0.027; Wilcoxon p-value 
is 0.004). Similarly, the mean EPS has decreased, relative to year -1, to 1.74 in year +1, 
while the median for the same period decreased to 0.11. The decrease is significant at the 
one percent level for both the mean and the median EPS, as p-value and Wilcoxon p-
value are equal to 0.001 and 0.000, respectively. Furthermore, the mean EPS has also 
decreased, relative to year -1, to 1.82 in year +2, while the median for the same period 
decreased to 0.29. The decrease is statistically significant at the one percent level for 
both the mean and the median EPS, as p-value and Wilcoxon p-value are equal to 0.001 
and 0.000, respectively. Finally the mean EPS has decreased, relative to year -1, to 1.46 
in year +3, while the median for the same period decreased to 0.17. The decrease is also 
statistically significant at the one percent level for both the mean and the median EPS, as 
p-value and Wilcoxon p-value are equal to 0.002 and 0.000, respectively. 
 To continue with panel C of table 11, it can be observed that the mean EPS is 
4.28 one year prior to the year of the stock split and it decreases by 5.58 to -1.3 during 
the year of the stock split. Additionally, the median EPS for the same time period 
decreases from 1.02 to 0.78. The decrease is statistically insignificant at any 
conventional level for both the mean and the median EPS (p-value is 0.290; Wilcoxon p-
value is 0.258). Similarly, the mean EPS has decreased, relative to year -1, to 3.68 in 
year +1, while the median for the same period decreased to 0.52. The decrease is 
statistically insignificant at any conventional level for the mean, while it is significant 
for the median EPS only at 10 percent level, as p-value and Wilcoxon p-value are equal 
to 0.878 and 0.063, respectively. Contrary to the previous periods the mean EPS 
Stock Splits: Evidence from the German Stock Exchange 2013 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
40 
increased, relative to year -1, to 5.67 in year +2, while the median for the same period 
decreased to 0.73. However, both these changes are statistically insignificant at any 
conventional level, as p-value and Wilcoxon p-value are equal to 0.749 and 0.229, 
respectively. Finally the mean EPS has increased, relative to year -1, to 6.68 in year +3, 
while the median for the same period decreased to 0.76. Both these changes are 
statistically insignificant at any conventional, as p-value and Wilcoxon p-value are equal 
to 0.608 and 0.366, respectively. 
Generally, we find both in the “full” sample and in its sub-samples a decrease in 
EPS in the year of the announcement of the stock split and the years following this 
announcement respect to the value of the EPS one year prior to the announcement of the 
stock split. Our results are not in line with the majority of the previous studies which 
found an improvement or no change in EPS. In particular, results are not consistent with 
those of Lakonishok and Lev (1987) who found that EPS improves in the pre-split 
period and remains stable afterwards (Lakonishok & Lev, 1987) and those of McNichols 
and Dravid (1990) who found significant improvement in EPS for splitting stocks. 
(McNichols & Dravid, 1990). We conclude that evidence does not show that splitting 
firms realize above average earnings performance prior to the stock split. Finally, the 
deterioration in EPS can be explained by the fact that the global economic crisis has 
affected negatively the stock prices and the fundamentals of German firms during the 
years 2008 and 2009 and  as a consequence, contrary to previous literature no signaling 
effects were observed following stock splits announcements. 
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Table 11: Mean and Median of Earnings per Share (EPS) surrounding the 
announcement of Stock Splits (“full” sample) 
 
Panel A: Earnings per share surrounding the announcement of Stock Splits year (all split factors)  
Years -1 0 1 2 3 Period (-1, 0) (-1, +1) (-1, +2) (-1, +3) 
Mean 14,48 3,06 2,71 3,77 4,14 Change -11,42 -11,77 -10,71 -10,34 
Median 1,33 0,70 0,43 0,52 0,51 P-value 0,016** 0,004*** 0,011** 0,018** 
N 158 157 156 154 146 Wilcoxon p-value 0,005*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 
 
 
 
Panel B: Earnings per share surrounding the announcement of Stock Splits year (Split factor≥ 3)  
Years -1 0 1 2 3 Period (-1, 0) (-1, +1) (-1, +2) (-1, +3) 
Mean 24,68 7,48 1,74 1,82 1,46 Change -17,2 -22,94 -22,86 -23,22 
Median 2,47 0,69 0,11 0,29 0,17 P-value 0,027** 0,001*** 0,001*** 0,002*** 
N 79 78 78 76 71 Wilcoxon p-value 0,006*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 0,000*** 
 
 
 
Panel C: Earnings per share surrounding the announcement of Stock Splits year (Split factor < 3)  
Years -1 0 1 2 3 Period (-1, 0) (-1, +1) (-1, +2) (-1, +3) 
Mean 4,28 -1,30 3,68 5,67 6,68 Change -5,58 -0,6 1,39 2,40 
Median 1,02 0,78 0,52 0,73 0,76 P-value 0,290 0,878 0,749 0,608 
N 79 79 78 78 75 Wilcoxon p-value 0,258 0,063* 0,229 0,366 
 
Notes: Earnings per Share (EPS) is defined as the net income scaled by number of shares outstanding. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
As for the “pure” sample, in panel A of table 12 the mean EPS is 9.76 one year 
prior to the year of the stock split and it decreases by 6.85 to 2.91 during the year of the 
stock split, which is denoted as year 0. Additionally, the median EPS for the same time 
period decreases from 0.95 to 0.41. The decrease is statistically insignificant at any 
conventional level for the mean and significant at 5 percent level for the median EPS (p-
value is 0.131; Wilcoxon p-value is 0.039). Similarly, the mean EPS has decreased, 
relative to year -1, to 2.99 in year +1, while the median for the same period decreased to 
0.16. The decrease is significant at the 5 percent level for the mean and at the one 
percent level for the median EPS, as p-value and Wilcoxon p-value are equal to 0.046 
and 0.00, respectively. Furthermore, the mean EPS has also decreased, relative to year -
1, to 4.17 in year +2, while the median for the same period decreased to 0.33. The 
associated decrease of the mean EPS is statistically insignificant at any conventional 
level (p-value is 0.118), while the decrease of the median EPS is statistically significant 
at the one percent level (Wilcoxon p-value is 0.002). Finally the mean EPS has 
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decreased, relative to year -1, to 4.66 in year +3, while the median for the same period 
decreased to 0.30. The associated decrease of the mean EPS is statistically insignificant 
at any conventional level (p-value is 0.176), while the decrease of the median EPS is 
statistically significant at the one percent level (Wilcoxon p-value is 0.004). 
 Moreover, in panel B of table 12, it can be observed that the mean EPS is 14.13 
one year prior to the year of the stock split and it decreases by 6.57 to 7.56 during the 
year of the stock split. Additionally, the median EPS for the same time period decreases 
from 1.62 to 0.30. The decrease is statistically insignificant at any conventional level for 
the mean and significant for 5 percent level for the median EPS (p-value is 0.262; 
Wilcoxon p-value is 0.046). Similarly, the mean EPS has decreased, relative to year -1, 
to 1.74 in year +1, while the median for the same period decreased to 0.04. The decrease 
is significant at the one percent level for both the mean and the median EPS, as p-value 
and Wilcoxon p-value are equal to 0.006 and 0.00, respectively. Furthermore, the mean 
EPS has also decreased, relative to year -1, to 1.71 in year +2, while the median for the 
same period decreased to 0.12. The decrease is statistically significant at the one percent 
level for both the mean and the median EPS, as p-value and Wilcoxon p-value are equal 
to 0.005 and 0.001, respectively. Finally the mean EPS has decreased, relative to year -1, 
to 1.43 in year +3, while the median for the same period decreased to 0.05. The decrease 
is also statistically significant at the one percent level for both the mean and the median 
EPS, as p-value and Wilcoxon p-value are equal to 0.005 and 0.001, respectively. 
 To continue with, panel C of table 12 shows that the mean EPS is 4.87 one year 
prior to the year of the stock split and that it decreases by 7.15 to -2.28 during the year of 
the stock split. Additionally, the median EPS for the same time period decreases from 
0.80 to 0.53. The decrease is statistically insignificant at any conventional level for both 
the mean and the median EPS (p-value is 0.305; Wilcoxon p-value is 0.305). Similarly, 
the mean EPS has decreased, relative to year -1, to 4.42 in year +1, while the median for 
the same period decreased to 0.39. The decrease is statistically insignificant at any 
conventional level for both the mean and the median EPS, as p-value and Wilcoxon p-
value are equal to 0.930 and 0.139, respectively. Contrary to the previous periods the 
mean EPS increased, relative to year -1, to 6.92 in year +2, while the median for the 
same period decreased to 0.51. However, both these changes are statistically 
insignificant at any conventional level, as p-value and Wilcoxon p-value are equal to 
0.721 and 0.282, respectively. Finally the mean EPS has increased, relative to year -1, to 
8.18 in year +3, while the median for the same period decreased to 0.51. Both these 
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changes are statistically insignificant at any conventional level, as p-value and Wilcoxon 
p-value are equal to 0.591 and 0.406, respectively. 
 The results reported in table 12 for the “pure” sample and its sub-samples do not 
present substantial difference from those of the “full” sample and its sub-samples as also 
in this case a deterioration of the EPS in the year of the announcement of the stock split 
and the following years of the announcement is noticed. Results are again not in line 
with those of previous studies which found an improvement or no change in EPS 
(Lakonishok & Lev, 1987), (McNichols & Dravid, 1990) and (Leledakis, Papaioannou, 
Travlos, & Tsangarakis, 2009) but consistent with our initial expectations about the 
absence of signaling effects, as the stock prices and the fundamentals of German firms 
were affected negatively by the global credit crunch.  
 
Table 12: Mean and Median of Earnings per Share (EPS) surrounding the 
announcement of Stock Splits (“pure” sample) 
 
Panel A: Earnings per share surrounding the announcement of Stock Splits year (all split factors) 
 
Years -1 0 1 2 3 Period (-1, 0) (-1, +1) (-1, +2) (-1, +3) 
Mean 9,76 2,91 2,99 4,17 4,66 Change -6,85 -6,77 -5,59 -5,10 
Median 0,95 0,41 0,16 0,33 0,30 P-value 0,131 0,046** 0,118 0,176 
N 127 127 126 125 119 Wilcoxon p-value 0,039** 0,000*** 0,002*** 0,004*** 
 
 
 
Panel B: Earnings per share surrounding the announcement of Stock Splits year (Split factor≥ 3) 
 
Years -1 0 1 2 3 Period (-1, 0) (-1, +1) (-1, +2) (-1, +3) 
Mean 14,13 7,56 1,74 1,71 1,43 Change -6,57 -12,39 -12,42 -12,70 
Median 1,62 0,30 0,04 0,12 0,05 P-value 0,262 0,006*** 0,005*** 0,005*** 
N 67 67 67 66 62 Wilcoxon p-value 0,046** 0,000*** 0,001*** 0,001*** 
 
 
 
Panel C: Earnings per share surrounding the announcement of Stock Splits year (Split factor < 3) 
 
Years -1 0 1 2 3 Period (-1, 0) (-1, +1) (-1, +2) (-1, +3) 
Mean 4,87 -2,28 4,42 6,92 8,18 Change -7,15 -0,45 2,05 3,31 
Median 0,80 0,53 0,39 0,51 0,51 P-value 0,305 0,930 0,721 0,591 
N 60 60 59 59 57 Wilcoxon p-value  0,305 0,139 0,282 0,406 
 
Notes: Earnings per Share (EPS) is defined as the net income scaled by number of shares outstanding. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
In conclusion, in panel A of table 13 the mean EPS is 33.82 one year prior to the 
year of the stock split and it decreases by 30.12 to 3.7 during the year of the stock split, 
which is denoted as year 0. Additionally, the median EPS for the same time period 
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decreases from 2.76 to 1.71. The decrease is statistically significant at 10 percent level 
for the mean and 5 percent level for the median EPS (p-value is 0.054; Wilcoxon p-value 
is 0.010). Similarly, the mean EPS has decreased, relative to year -1, to 1.54 in year +1, 
while the median for the same period decreased to 1.33. The decrease is significant at the 
5 percent level for the mean and at the one percent level for the median EPS, as p-value 
and Wilcoxon p-value are equal to 0.038 and 0.007, respectively. Furthermore, the mean 
EPS has also decreased, relative to year -1, to 2.03 in year +2, while the median for the 
same period decreased to 1.52. The associated decrease of the mean EPS is statistically 
significant at 5 percent level (p-value is 0.044), while the decrease of the median EPS is 
statistically significant at the one percent level (Wilcoxon p-value is 0.007). Finally the 
mean EPS has decreased, relative to year -1, to 1.86 in year +3, while the median for the 
same period decreased to 1.57. The associated decrease of the mean EPS is statistically 
significant at 10 percent level (p-value is 0.051), while the decrease of the median EPS is 
statistically significant at the one percent level (Wilcoxon p-value is 0.005). 
Finally, also in the “contaminated” sample, which is consisted of stocks that 
contemporarily announced a stock split and another corporate event of the same stock, 
such as a stock dividend or a rights issue we observe a decrease  in the EPS both in the 
year of the announcement and the following years, result that supports the assumption 
that German firms did not experienced superior improvement in earnings and that did 
not use stock splits to signal superior future earnings performance. Results are again in 
contrast with those of previous studies which examined a similar sample and found an 
improvement or no change in EPS (Lakonishok & Lev, 1987), (McNichols & Dravid, 
1990) but consistent with our initial expectations about the absence of signaling effects.  
 
Table 13: Mean and Median of Earnings per Share (EPS) surrounding the 
announcement of Stock Splits (“contaminated” sample) 
 
Panel A: Earnings per share surrounding the announcement of Stock Splits year (all split factors) 
 
Years -1 0 1 2 3 Period (-1, 0) (-1, +1) (-1, +2) (-1, +3) 
Mean 33,82 3,70 1,54 2,03 1,86 Change -30,12 --32,28 -31,79 -31,96 
Median 2,76 1,71 1,33 1,52 1,57 P-value 0,054* 0,038** 0,044** 0,051* 
N 31 30 30 29 27 Wilcoxon p-value 0,010** 0,007*** 0,007*** 0,005*** 
 
Notes: Earnings per Share (EPS) is defined as the net income scaled by number of shares outstanding. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
“Although stock splits seem to be a purely cosmetic event, there exists ample 
empirical evidence from the United States that stock splits are associated with abnormal 
returns on the announcement day.” (Wulff, 2002) This dissertation investigates the stock 
price reaction to stock splits executed by firms traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
during years 2008 and 2009. “In the U.S., as in Germany, stock splits increase the 
number of shares without leading to an inflow or outflow of cash, without changing the 
investment opportunities of the corporation, or even without changing its book value. 
The increase in the number of shares is done by reducing the par value of the share 
accordingly, while the main difference between stock splits in Germany and the U.S. is 
largely in the fundamental role of the par value of German stocks. The increase in the 
number of shares is done by reducing the par value of the share accordingly. The main 
difference between stock splits in Germany and the U.S. is largely in the fundamental 
role of the par value of German stocks.” (Wulff, 2002)  
The study consists of three major samples, which are the “full”, the “pure” and 
the “contaminated” sample and four sub-samples, which are constructed from the 
division of the “full” and “pure” sample based on the size of the split factor. First, we 
test whether, as in most countries, the  German  market  reacts  positively  on  the  
announcement  day,  generating  significantly positive abnormal returns around this day. 
The price reaction tests are performed relative to the announcement of the stock split. 
The price reaction is estimated by applying the market model and the market-adjusted 
returns model. Unlike the evidence of strong positive announcement price effects 
associated with stock splits in the U.S., there is no price reaction at the announcement of 
stock splits on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange for stock splits undertaken by German 
firms during years 2008 and 2009 for any of the sample constructed for the purpose of 
this study except for the “full” sample with split factor lower than 3 and the 
“contaminated” sample. Although the latter two samples provide some announcement 
effect associated with stock splits, this effect does not seem to clearly strengthen the   
evidence of significant positive reaction around the stock split announcement day. 
Stock Splits: Evidence from the German Stock Exchange 2013 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
46 
Generally, the results are not in line with the results of many other studies on stock splits 
in different capital markets and no evidence of significant positive market reaction 
around the stock split announcement day is found. As a result, stock split 
announcements of German firms do not bring about significant stock price appreciations 
to investors in this particular period examined. Furthermore, the signaling hypothesis, 
which predicts that managers attempt to convey their private positive expectations about 
their firm’s prospects, was tested. In order to test for signaling effects, pre-split and post-
split earning per share (EPS) were compared using equality tests for mean and median 
earnings per share. The results reported for all samples and sub-samples examined 
suggest that German firms that split their shares during the years 2008 and 2009, period 
in which the global economic crisis exploded, did not experience superior improvement 
in earnings during the year of the split or the years following the year of the split. The 
results suggest that German firms did not use stock splits to signal superior future 
earnings performance. Additionally, this study argues that legal restrictions strongly 
limit the ability of German companies to use a stock split for signaling.  
To conclude, the findings of this study do not expand the international evidence 
about the value consequences of stock splits. It is important to mention that the period 
selected in order to examine the use of stock split announcements and investigate the 
market reaction to them, is the period which signals the beginning of the economic 
crisis. We can assume that the effects of the global economic crisis are the main reason  
that the findings of our dissertation are in contrast with and differ from those of many 
other studies on stock splits. However, the results provided do not discard the findings of 
previous studies which conclude that there is ample empirical evidence from the 
different capital markets all around the world that stock splits are associated with 
abnormal returns on the announcement day and have a positive impact on share prices. 
In order to have a more clear and definite inference about price reaction and signaling 
effects of stock splits announcement in Germany a larger period of investigation should 
be taken into consideration expanding the years of research both prior to the year 2008 
and post to the year 2009.  
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Company Security ID 
Announce/De
clared Date 
Effective 
Date Summary 
Quicksilver Resources Inc 
QSR GR 
Equity 7/1/2008 1/2/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
MICROS Systems Inc 
MS6 GR 
Equity 8/1/2008 6/2/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Robbins & Myers Inc 
RBB GR 
Equity 9/1/2008 29/2/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
PMFG Inc 
PFG GR 
Equity 10/1/2008 18/8/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Moshi Moshi Hotline Inc 
MMK GR 
Equity 11/1/2008 28/1/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Umicore SA 
NVJN GR 
Equity 11/1/2008 29/2/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 5 
Top-Wetten AG 
SOS GR 
Equity 15/1/2008 17/1/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 3 
Public Service Enterprise Group 
Inc 
PSE GR 
Equity 15/1/2008 5/2/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Cia Siderurgica Nacional SA 
CQWA GR 
Equity 17/1/2008 11/2/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 3 
Energy Metals Ltd 
E9M GR 
Equity 18/1/2008 29/2/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 3 
RMA Energy Ltd 
RMA GR 
Equity 22/1/2008 7/3/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 4 
Bank Central Asia Tbk PT 
BZG2 GR 
Equity 22/1/2008 28/1/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Hutter & Schrantz Stahlbau AG 
HUS GR 
Equity 23/1/2008 28/1/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 3 
New Jersey Resources Corp 
NJ1 GR 
Equity 23/1/2008 4/3/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.5 
HL Display AB 
H1D GR 
Equity 24/1/2008 24/4/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 4 
China Sports International Ltd 
3C6A GR 
Equity 28/1/2008 5/5/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Ceotronics AG 
CEK GR 
Equity 30/1/2008 1/2/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 3 
AppTech Corp 
HEJB GR 
Equity 30/1/2008 15/2/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.25 
Hologic Inc 
HO1 GR 
Equity 30/1/2008 3/4/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Gas Natural Inc 
38G GR 
Equity 30/1/2008 5/2/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.5 
Alfa Laval AB 
AA9 GR 
Equity 6/2/2008 5/6/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 4 
Ballingslov International AB 
BLY GR 
Equity 8/2/2008 27/5/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 3 
Nobel Biocare Holding AG 
NLB1 GR 
Equity 11/2/2008 3/4/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 5 
PAREXEL International Corp PRXL GR 12/2/2008 4/3/2008 Adjustment 
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Equity Factor: 2 
SEB SA 
GRB GR 
Equity 14/2/2008 16/6/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 3 
Tethys Oil AB 
TZB GR 
Equity 14/2/2008 3/3/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 3 
BASF SE 
BAS GR 
Equity 21/2/2008 27/6/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
MTI Ltd 
MBO GR 
Equity 21/2/2008 26/3/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
NIC Corp 
NIZ GR 
Equity 21/2/2008 26/3/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Cairo Communication SpA 
CI1 GR 
Equity 21/2/2008 25/2/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 10 
Suncor Energy Inc 
SM3 GR 
Equity 27/2/2008 12/5/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Southwestern Energy Co 
SW5 GR 
Equity 28/2/2008 26/3/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Unicharm Petcare Corp 
UPQ GR 
Equity 29/2/2008 26/3/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Steel Dynamics Inc 
SD5 GR 
Equity 4/3/2008 31/3/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Petroleo Brasileiro SA 
PJXB GR 
Equity 5/3/2008 28/4/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
E.ON SE 
EOAN GR 
Equity 6/3/2008 4/8/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 3 
Timah Persero Tbk PT 
TIH1 GR 
Equity 11/3/2008 8/8/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 10 
Cliffs Natural Resources Inc 
CVA GR 
Equity 11/3/2008 16/5/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Suryainti Permata Tbk PT 
XQO1 GR 
Equity 11/3/2008 12/3/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 4 
Samart I-Mobile PCL 
TDZ2 GR 
Equity 13/3/2008 8/5/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 10 
Union Fenosa SA 
UEF2 GR 
Equity 13/3/2008 14/7/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 3 
Sociedad Quimica y Minera de 
Chile SA 
QYM GR 
Equity 17/3/2008 31/3/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 10 
MCH Group AG 
MEF1 GR 
Equity 18/3/2008 19/5/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 10 
Chindex International Inc 
UC1 GR 
Equity 19/3/2008 17/4/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.5 
Sulzer AG 
SUL1 GR 
Equity 20/3/2008 14/4/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 10 
Energiedienst Holding AG 
KWK3 GR 
Equity 20/3/2008 27/6/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 10 
Bank J Safra Sarasin AG 
BKC1 GR 
Equity 26/3/2008 7/5/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 100 
Petroleo Brasileiro SA 
PJXA GR 
Equity 26/3/2008 8/5/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Petroleo Brasileiro SA 
PJX GR 
Equity 26/3/2008 8/5/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Lomiko Metals Inc 
DH8B GR 
Equity 26/3/2008 3/10/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 4 
Banco Bradesco SA 
BREC GR 
Equity 28/3/2008 16/4/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.5 
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Kingdee International Software 
Group Co Ltd 
KDIC GR 
Equity 1/4/2008 9/5/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 4 
Truewest Corp 
YFLB GR 
Equity 4/4/2008 7/4/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 100 
Kuzbassenergo OJSC 
KUW GR 
Equity 4/4/2008 22/4/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
ElringKlinger AG 
ZIL2 GR 
Equity 9/4/2008 7/7/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 3 
EVN AG 
EVN GR 
Equity 10/4/2008 17/4/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 4 
Surgutneftegas OAO 
SGN GR 
Equity 10/4/2008 18/4/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 5 
Surgutneftegas OAO 
SGNV GR 
Equity 10/4/2008 18/4/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 10 
Nestle SA 
NESR GR 
Equity 11/4/2008 30/6/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 10 
Weatherford International 
Ltd/Switzerland 
WH4 GR 
Equity 21/4/2008 27/5/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Atlas Energy Inc 
UXR GR 
Equity 23/4/2008 2/6/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.5 
East Japan Railway Co 
EJR GR 
Equity 28/4/2008 5/1/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 100 
Piscines Desjoyaux SA 
DJX GR 
Equity 29/4/2008 5/5/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 4 
GOME Electrical Appliances 
Holding Ltd 
CKS2 GR 
Equity 29/4/2008 23/5/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 4 
Life Technologies Corp 
IVN GR 
Equity 30/4/2008 28/5/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Bucyrus International Inc 
DHG GR 
Equity 30/4/2008 28/5/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
China State Construction 
International Holdings Ltd 
C4S1 GR 
Equity 30/4/2008 13/6/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 4 
Alstom SA 
AOMD GR 
Equity 7/5/2008 7/7/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Fluor Corp 
FLU GR 
Equity 7/5/2008 17/7/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Inter Parfums Inc 
JF1 GR 
Equity 7/5/2008 2/6/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.5 
Mechel 
MHSA GR 
Equity 8/5/2008 20/5/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 3 
Arcadis NV 
HIJ2 GR 
Equity 9/5/2008 16/5/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 3 
Nippon Telegraph & Telephone 
Corp 
NTT GR 
Equity 15/5/2008 5/1/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 100 
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group 
Inc 
XMF GR 
Equity 16/5/2008 5/1/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 100 
Yanzhou Coal Mining Co Ltd 
YZC GR 
Equity 16/5/2008 7/7/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 5 
Resona Holdings Inc 
DW1 GR 
Equity 16/5/2008 5/1/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 100 
Chinese Energy Holdings Ltd 
IXSE GR 
Equity 19/5/2008 27/6/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 5 
Impress Holdings Inc 
IMB GR 
Equity 20/5/2008 5/1/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 100 
Metall Zug AG NDH1 GR 21/5/2008 26/5/2008 Adjustment 
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Equity Factor: 2 
Itau Unibanco Holding SA 
BVXB GR 
Equity 22/5/2008 10/6/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.25 
Nippon Paper Group Inc 
NUP GR 
Equity 23/5/2008 5/1/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 100 
Kakaku.com Inc 
KKC GR 
Equity 27/5/2008 25/6/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
CGG 
CGG1 GR 
Equity 27/5/2008 3/6/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 5 
Oberbank AG 
OBK3 GR 
Equity 27/5/2008 23/7/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 3 
Oberbank AG 
OBK GR 
Equity 27/5/2008 23/7/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 3 
Polyus Gold OJSC 
P6J2 GR 
Equity 30/5/2008 11/6/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Gerdau SA 
GDUA GR 
Equity 30/5/2008 20/6/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Parkson Retail Group Ltd 
P5IB GR 
Equity 3/6/2008 7/7/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 5 
Pyramid Oil Co 
P3C GR 
Equity 9/6/2008 7/7/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.25 
Atwood Oceanics Inc 
AWZ GR 
Equity 11/6/2008 14/7/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Titan International Inc 
TZ4 GR 
Equity 11/6/2008 18/8/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.25 
Nestle SA 
NESM GR 
Equity 13/6/2008 3/7/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2.5 
Southern Copper Corp 
PCU GR 
Equity 19/6/2008 10/7/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 3 
Vectron Systems AG 
V3S GR 
Equity 20/6/2008 24/6/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 3 
Lecico Egypt SAE 
L3G GR 
Equity 24/6/2008 15/7/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
K+S AG 
SDF GR 
Equity 3/7/2008 21/7/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 4 
Cia de Minas Buenaventura SAA 
MBU GR 
Equity 7/7/2008 23/7/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Art's-Way Manufacturing Co Inc 
BQG GR 
Equity 9/7/2008 31/7/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Central Telecommunication Co 
T2T GR 
Equity 10/7/2008 1/8/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 4 
Dalsvyaz OJSC 
0020700D
GR Equity 10/7/2008 1/8/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 6 
North-West Telecom 
SQ4 GR 
Equity 10/7/2008 1/8/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 5 
Sibirtelecom OJSC 
S3T1 GR 
Equity 10/7/2008 1/8/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 4 
Computer Modelling Group Ltd 
5TJ GR 
Equity 11/7/2008 30/7/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Activision Blizzard Inc 
AIY GR 
Equity 11/7/2008 8/9/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Iaso SA 
IJ5 GR 
Equity 11/7/2008 16/7/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 
1.206 
Australia & New Zealand Banking ANB1 GR 17/7/2008 24/7/2008 Adjustment 
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Group Ltd Equity Factor: 5 
Greiffenberger AG 
GRF GR 
Equity 18/7/2008 23/7/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 10 
Illumina Inc 
ILU GR 
Equity 22/7/2008 23/9/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Patriot Coal Corp 
3PC GR 
Equity 24/7/2008 12/8/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Perusahaan Gas Negara Persero 
Tbk PT 
PGB1 GR 
Equity 28/7/2008 4/8/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 5 
Alexion Pharmaceuticals Inc 
AXPM GR 
Equity 29/7/2008 25/8/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Synaptics Inc 
SJN GR 
Equity 31/7/2008 2/9/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.5 
Ebix Inc 
EWZ GR 
Equity 1/8/2008 9/10/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 3 
EnServe Group Ltd 
RWO1 GR 
Equity 5/8/2008 8/9/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 5 
Incitec Pivot Ltd 
I5P GR 
Equity 6/8/2008 17/9/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 20 
CD International Enterprises Inc 
CH4A GR 
Equity 6/8/2008 22/9/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 100 
Integral Systems Inc/MD 
IS3 GR 
Equity 13/8/2008 8/9/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
DVB Bank SE 
DVB GR 
Equity 14/8/2008 18/8/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 10 
China Southern Airlines Co Ltd 
ZNH GR 
Equity 25/8/2008 23/9/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.5 
Euroz Ltd 
E7L1 GR 
Equity 1/9/2008 9/10/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
DXP Enterprises Inc 
DX7 GR 
Equity 8/9/2008 1/10/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
RAM Active Media PLC 
RM3A GR 
Equity 8/9/2008 30/9/2008 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2000 
Buckle Inc/The 
BK2 GR 
Equity 15/9/2008 
31/10/200
8 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.5 
UBISOFT Entertainment 
UEN GR 
Equity 22/9/2008 
14/11/200
8 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Dentsu Inc 
DEN GR 
Equity 25/9/2008 5/1/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 100 
Parallel Media Group PLC 
PTV2 GR 
Equity 29/9/2008 
27/10/200
8 
Adjustment 
Factor: 4000 
Colorado Goldfields Inc 
G1W2 GR 
Equity 17/10/2008 
28/11/200
8 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.3 
Round One Corp 
RDN GR 
Equity 23/10/2008 5/1/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 100 
Village Super Market Inc 
VSU GR 
Equity 5/12/2008 23/1/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
General Maritime Corp 
G02 GR 
Equity 5/12/2008 
17/12/200
8 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.34 
Fountain Healthy Aging Inc 
U7IB GR 
Equity 17/12/2008 
23/12/200
8 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Capital Resource Alliance Inc 
0CR GR 
Equity 17/12/2008 
18/12/200
8 
Adjustment 
Factor: 3 
Morphosys AG 
MOR GR 
Equity 22/12/2008 
23/12/200
8 
Adjustment 
Factor: 3 
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Roche Holding AG 
RHO6 GR 
Equity 23/12/2008 9/1/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Life Partners Holdings Inc 
LPQ GR 
Equity 6/1/2009 18/2/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.25 
Keyence Corp 
KEE GR 
Equity 30/1/2009 16/3/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.1 
Nichii Gakkan Co 
NG4 GR 
Equity 10/2/2009 26/3/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Myriad Genetics Inc 
MYD GR 
Equity 24/2/2009 26/3/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Societe des Bains de Mer et du 
Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco 
RJ8 GR 
Equity 10/3/2009 12/3/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 10 
Schweizerische National-
Versicherungs-Gesellschaft AG 
FB9 GR 
Equity 1/4/2009 26/5/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 20 
Cia Energetica de Minas Gerais 
CID GR 
Equity 20/4/2009 14/5/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.25 
Orascom Construction Industries 
ORK GR 
Equity 30/4/2009 7/5/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
BKS Bank AG 
ZUE GR 
Equity 5/5/2009 5/6/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 6 
BKS Bank AG 
BK5 GR 
Equity 5/5/2009 5/6/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 6 
Bank fuer Tirol & Vorarlberg AG 
ZTY GR 
Equity 6/5/2009 10/6/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 5 
Bank fuer Tirol & Vorarlberg AG 
ZUD GR 
Equity 6/5/2009 10/6/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 5 
AmerisourceBergen Corp 
ABG GR 
Equity 19/5/2009 16/6/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Green Mountain Coffee Roasters 
Inc 
GM2 GR 
Equity 19/5/2009 9/6/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.5 
Water Intelligence PLC 
PHRC GR 
Equity 19/5/2009 11/6/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 10 
Ad Pepper Media International 
NV 
APM GR 
Equity 25/5/2009 27/5/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Desert Gold Ventures Inc 
QXR1 GR 
Equity 5/6/2009 8/6/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 400 
Prime People PLC 
RCJ2 GR 
Equity 9/6/2009 8/7/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 500 
Delticom AG 
DEX GR 
Equity 16/6/2009 22/6/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 3 
American Physicians Capital Inc 
8243101Q
GR Equity 23/6/2009 3/8/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 
1.33333 
Marenave Schiffahrts AG 
M5S GR 
Equity 7/7/2009 16/7/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 10 
NPC Inc/Japan 
59N GR 
Equity 30/7/2009 26/8/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
TagLikeMe Corp 
M6C1 GR 
Equity 31/7/2009 3/8/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
General Metals Corp 
GMQ2 GR 
Equity 3/8/2009 4/1/2011 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.1 
Park Place Energy Corp 
3P2N GR 
Equity 5/8/2009 3/9/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 10 
Cross Border Resources Inc 
0DE2 GR 
Equity 18/8/2009 14/9/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 5 
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A.G.BARR PLC 
AF71 GR 
Equity 26/8/2009 21/9/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
United Therapeutics Corp 
UTH GR 
Equity 1/9/2009 23/9/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
China Eco-Farming Ltd 
LFN1 GR 
Equity 2/9/2009 
13/10/200
9 
Adjustment 
Factor: 10 
Erlus AG 
DZE GR 
Equity 24/9/2009 5/10/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 10 
CVM Minerals Ltd 
CWU2 GR 
Equity 24/9/2009 
19/10/200
9 
Adjustment 
Factor: 4 
Koss Corp 
KO1 GR 
Equity 25/9/2009 2/12/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Gold Hill Resources Inc 
GATN GR 
Equity 29/9/2009 29/1/2010 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.75 
Southern Cross Resource Group 
Inc/PA 
6SH GR 
Equity 1/10/2009 5/10/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 5 
San West Inc 
HB2N GR 
Equity 12/10/2009 3/11/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 5 
Sino Dragon New Energy Holdings 
Ltd 
ZIJB GR 
Equity 13/10/2009 9/11/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 20 
Ruifeng Petroleum Chemical 
Holdings Ltd 
T1H3 GR 
Equity 14/10/2009 5/11/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 5 
Insight Management Corp 
746N GR 
Equity 20/10/2009 
10/11/200
9 
Adjustment 
Factor: 7 
Jipangu Inc 
PMK GR 
Equity 28/10/2009 
28/12/200
9 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Wimm-Bill-Dann Foods OJSC 
WBPA GR 
Equity 30/10/2009 
17/11/200
9 
Adjustment 
Factor: 4 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc 
BRYN GR 
Equity 3/11/2009 21/1/2010 
Adjustment 
Factor: 50 
Computech Holdings Ltd 
XOPE GR 
Equity 4/11/2009 4/12/2009 
Adjustment 
Factor: 5 
Mei Ah Entertainment Group Ltd 
MFK1 GR 
Equity 5/11/2009 
22/12/200
9 
Adjustment 
Factor: 5 
Neogen Corp 
NG2 GR 
Equity 16/11/2009 
16/12/200
9 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.5 
Universal Health Services Inc 
UHS GR 
Equity 18/11/2009 
16/12/200
9 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Universal Health Services Inc 
UHS1 GR 
Equity 18/11/2009 
16/12/200
9 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Lee & Man Paper Manufacturing 
Ltd 
LMP GR 
Equity 30/11/2009 
21/12/200
9 
Adjustment 
Factor: 4 
Hong Kong Building & Loan 
Agency Ltd/The 
HK8A GR 
Equity 2/12/2009 11/2/2010 
Adjustment 
Factor: 10 
Intek Group SpA 
IKG1 GR 
Equity 3/12/2009 8/2/2010 
Adjustment 
Factor: 1.5 
Cairn Energy PLC 
FKGC GR 
Equity 4/12/2009 
22/12/200
9 
Adjustment 
Factor: 10 
NZX Ltd 
5NZ GR 
Equity 7/12/2009 
22/12/200
9 
Adjustment 
Factor: 4 
Kazakhtelecom JSC 
KZTA GR 
Equity 7/12/2009 
16/12/200
9 
Adjustment 
Factor: 5 
Meyer Burger Technology AG 
M6YA GR 
Equity 10/12/2009 18/1/2010 
Adjustment 
Factor: 10 
Balchem Corp BL9B GR 11/12/2009 21/1/2010 Adjustment 
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Equity Factor: 1.5 
Japan Retail Fund Investment 
Corp 
59JA GR 
Equity 15/12/2009 24/2/2010 
Adjustment 
Factor: 4 
iOne Holdings Ltd 
IH2A GR 
Equity 16/12/2009 12/1/2010 
Adjustment 
Factor: 40 
Quantitative Alpha Trading Inc 
8RT GR 
Equity 17/12/2009 
21/12/200
9 
Adjustment 
Factor: 5 
Northwest Bancshares Inc 
NHS GR 
Equity 17/12/2009 
18/12/200
9 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2.25 
China Agritech Inc 
4CN1 GR 
Equity 17/12/2009 8/2/2010 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
Trina Solar Ltd 
TR3 GR 
Equity 30/12/2009 20/1/2010 
Adjustment 
Factor: 2 
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